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 The thesis argues that Kentuckians developed the myth that the Kentucky 
Mounted Volunteers were the most effective troops to fight Native American warriors in 
the Northwest Indian War of 1790 to 1794 and the War of 1812. The idea that these 
troops were the best fighters originated in the decades following the War of 1812 as 
Kentuckians generated a communal history. Residents of the state listened to orators 
mythologize the successes of mounted Kentuckians in battle, while remembering the foot 
militia for their sacrifices rather than their shortcomings.  
 This thesis also examines the battle record of the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers 
in both conflicts to demonstrate that this myth developed despite numerous defeats on the 
battlefield. In memory, however, the battle record of the mounted militia in Kentucky 
was presented as one of repeated victories, with minimal losses, in conflict after conflict, 
thus encouraging the development of the myth that the Kentuckians were the best troops 
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NOTES ABOUT TERMINOLOGY AND PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 Throughout this thesis, terms such as American Indians, Native Americans, 
warriors, and Native people appear interchangeably to enable a more expeditious 
description of Native Americans who came into contact with or fought whites in 
Kentucky and the Ohio Country. The Ohio Indians and Northwest Indians are used to 
describe those who joined the Native Confederations that fought the United States and 
Kentuckians in the 1790s and the War of 1812. The Shawnee and Miami were the two 
most powerful Indian nations of the Old Northwest that fought the United States in the 
timeframe of this thesis, but they allied with the Wea, Kickapoo, Delaware, Wyandot, 
Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Illinois nations in their fight against the United States. 
 This thesis distinguishes between those militia who were mounted and those who 
fought on foot. Mounted volunteers and militia refer to Kentuckians who participated in 
campaigns mounted on horseback. Kentuckians who participated on foot are referred to 











 On October 9, 1814, General William Henry Harrison, commanding officer of the 
American Northwest Army during the War of 1812, reflected on his recent victory over 
combined British and Indian forces at the Battle of the Thames River, and the death of 
the Pan-Confederation Indian leader Tecumseh. As he recounted the battle in a report to 
Secretary of War John Armstrong, Harrison praised the Kentuckians, particularly Richard 
Mentor Johnson’s regiment, who secured victory when they broke through enemy lines. 
He wrote: 
The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other 
people. A musket or a rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to 
carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded, too, 
that the enemy would be unprepared for the shock, and that they could not 
resist it.1 
 
 Harrison ordered Johnson’s regiment to charge before he finished lining up the 
regular troops because of the poor placement of the British defenders at the Thames. The 
British troops formed a loose defensive line making them an ideal target for a cavalry 
charge. Harrison’s assessment of the British and Indian lines was correct. Johnson’s 
regiment succeeded in breaking through the British lines, leading to a quick rout by the 
Americans. 
 As a result of the American victory at the Thames River, the Kentuckians 
regularly celebrated the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers, and the force achieved a 
                                                 
1 William Henry Harrison to Sectretary of War John Armstrong, 9 October 1814, William Henry Harrison, 
Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 





mythological status in the decades after the battle. Johnson gained the vice presidency in 
no small measure because people believe he killed Tecumseh in the battle. Orators 
repeatedly reminded Kentuckians of the victory and of those who died in previous 
conflicts with Native Americans during celebrations of the Fourth of July and President 
George Washington’s birthday. Speakers praised the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers as 
the elite force that secured the West for white settlement and allowed the United States to 
continue its westward expansion. 
 In the 1790s Northwest Indian War and the War of 1812, however, Kentuckians 
experienced numerous defeats and had only a few victories. Their victory at 
Moraviantown stands out as their lone success in a major battle. Despite such poor 
performances, historian John Grenier, in his recent study The First Way of War, writes, 
“By the 1810s, the mounted rangers of Kentucky were the most sought-after troops for 
killing the Indians of the Transappalachian West.” 2 
 This thesis explores the attitudes of Kentuckians towards the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers, tracking the development of the myth that this force was the best and most 
sought after Indian fighters in the Trans-Appalachian West. Kentuckians fought 
Northwest Indians beginning in the 1770s when the earliest white hunters began arriving 
in the Trans-Appalachian West, but large-scale campaigns assisted by the federal 
government did not begin until the Northwest Indian War of the 1790s. Prior to the 
federal government’s involvement, local militia and government leaders organized raids 
that usually consisted of a few hundred militiamen retaliating for attacks against white 
settlements. Between the Northwest Indian War of the 1790s and the War of 1812, 
                                                 
2 John Grenier, The First Way of War : American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York: 





Kentuckians participated in six offensive operations. In these six campaigns, Kentuckians 
suffered three losses, one draw, and two victories, including one which they played a 
supporting role to the regular army. 
 This thesis argues that the mounted rangers of Kentucky or Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers actually had a dismal battle record. Their lone success came at the Battle of 
Thames River against an enemy cut off from resupply and reinforcements and struggling 
with low morale, which led to many desertions in the days before the battle. Kentuckians’ 
participation in numerous offensive operations in the 1790s and War of 1812 reveals that 
three essential components were necessary for them to win. First, by fighting on 
horseback rather than as foot militia, the Kentucky volunteers managed to defeat their 
opponents. Second, Kentucky officers that the militiamen respected and proved 
themselves capable leaders also helped them emerge victorious. Last, better fighters 
participated when they volunteered for campaigns instead of being drafted as foot militia. 
Despite this rather checkered record, Kentucky Mounted Volunteers nevertheless 
achieved mythological status in the decades following the War of 1812. The aura 
originated among newspaper correspondents who wrote inflated stories about the militia, 
was enhanced by Kentucky citizens who defended the militia from citation after their 
defeats, and cemented by orators who remembered the militia’s few victories in the 
decades following the 1790s Northwest Indian War and War of 1812. The Battle of New 
Orleans and the subsequent arguments with General Andrew Jackson, commander of the 
American forces at the battle, acted as a catalyst for Kentuckians to defend and 
eventually inflate the accomplishments of the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers in the 





New Orleans. These arguments between Jackson and the militia’s defenders encouraged 
speakers in Kentucky to inflate the accomplishments of the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers, with a lasting impact on Kentuckians. 
*** 
The historiography of the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers contributed to the 
expansion of the myth that they were the most capable Indian fighters in the West, and 
the myth survives into the twenty-first century, partially promoted by Grenier. In addition 
to Grenier, Wiley Sword’s President Washington’s Indian War provides a thorough 
overview of the Northwest Indian War. Sword places the Kentuckians in context as the 
new federal government fought its first war. His overview of the entire conflict argues 
that federal officers’ ignorance of the enemy hindered the war effort and resulted in more 
offensives than necessary. He also argues that the mounted Kentuckians proved more 
effective in combat than the state’s foot militia. He adds that officers in the regular army 
failed to recognize the importance of employing men who understood the skulking way 
of war. Native Americans employed the skulking way of war against whites. The tactics 
used in this style of warfare include ambushes, firing at the enemy from covered 
positions, and raiding vulnerable settlements and towns.3 
 In addition to Sword, Jack Jule Gifford’s dissertation, “The Northwest Indian War 
1784-1794” provides a detailed analysis of the four major American offensives. Gifford’s 
argues that in the 1780s the American army was too small and weak to patrol in the Ohio 
Valley. The inadequate American force could not prevent whites from crossing the Ohio 
River to attack Native American villages or establish farms, nor could it effectively guard 
                                                 
3 Wiley Sword, President Washington's Indian War : The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795 





against Indian raiding parties entering Kentucky. His work convincingly shows that the 
small U.S. Army of the 1780s could not control the large border expanse of the Ohio 
Country, making it impossible for the national government to negotiate peace in good 
faith with the Ohio Indian nations. 4 
 Carl Edward Skeen’s Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 and Alan Taylor’s The 
Civil War of 1812 both provide overviews of the conflict and its many fronts. Skeen’s 
work explains how the militia transformed as threat of Indian attack lessened in 
Kentucky. As Kentuckians felt more secure, their militia companies stopped maintaining 
their weapons and assembling for training. In effect, Kentucky’s militia became a paper 
army. Skeen’s detailed accounts of the war reveal that the militia was not ready for war. 
When the United States declared war, the militia failed in nearly every engagement in 
which it participated. The lone exception was the Kentuckians participation in the second 
invasion of Upper Canada in the fall 1813.5 
 Taylor’s work provides an alternative perspective of the conflict and he does not 
place the militia at the center of his narrative. His work enables readers to understand 
how East Coast leaders and the British perceived the Kentuckians, whom they believed 
depended on hunting, dressed like Native Americans, and used military tactics similar to 
Indian warriors. Kentuckians took pride in the skulking tactics they employed in combat, 
and they refused to abandon these tactics despite critics. In the War of 1812, Kentuckians 
proved themselves capable mounted soldiers during the second invasion of Canada.6 
                                                 
4 Jack Jule Gifford, "The Northwest Indian War 1784-1795" (Phd diss., University of California at Los 
Angeles, 1964). 
5 Carl Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999); 
Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010). 





 Harry Laver thoroughly explores Kentucky’s civic and cultural development 
through the lens of the militia in Citizens More than Soldiers. Laver’s work examines the 
importance of militia units to the political, societal, racial, and economic development of 
the state. When they gathered for celebrations or anniversaries, citizens of Kentucky 
developed and later refined a national, state, and western identity in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century. Kentucky’s distinctive identity developed alongside a new 
national identity. Laver shows that the Kentuckians viewed themselves as equally 
American as residents of the eastern seaboard despite their geographic distance from the 
East. At gatherings, the militia took center stage. They put on martial displays for the 
crowd and speakers enthralled listeners with stories of conquest along with memorials to 
the militiamen killed in battle.7 
*** 
Among the primary sources used in the thesis, the American State Papers: Military 
Affairs and Indian Affairs, along with the Kentucky Gazette, proved invaluable. These 
sources cover both conflicts and reveal the opinions of political officials at the national 
and state level, as well as those of U.S. Army and Kentucky militia officers.8 The 
American State Papers include correspondence from leaders such as President George 
Washington, General Anthony Wayne, and Governor William Henry Harrison, reports 
from field commanders to national leaders, and court of inquiry findings that designate 
                                                 
7 Harry S. Laver, Citizens More Than Soldiers: The Kentucky Militia and Society in the Early Republic 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007). 
8 Kentucky Gazette, 1809; The Kentucky Gazette, 1789; United States Congress, American State Papers 
Indian Affairs (Buffalo, N.Y.: W.S. Hein, 1998).(hereafter ASPIA); American State Papers Military Affairs 





the reasons for military defeats. The reports and letters of American commanders offered 
detailed descriptions about the failed offensives.  
 The Kentucky Gazette described the conflicts from the perspective of 
Kentuckians. The newspaper published public calls for volunteers to participate in 
campaigns in both conflicts. The Kentucky Gazette also published many contemporary 
speeches that recalled and memorialized the exploits of the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers. These speeches reveal how the citizens in Kentucky created their state, 
western, and national identities. 
*** 
 The first chapter of this thesis describes how Kentuckians learned Indian hunting 
methods after their arrival in the West in the 1770s. The earliest European arrivals to 
Kentucky depended solely on hunting for their survival. Because Indian hunting methods 
and skulking warfare tactics closely resembled one another in warfare, recently arrived 
whites also became familiar with the Indian way of war. White hunters were not as 
capable as their Indian counterparts, but replicating their methods and technology 
improved their skills. As more white hunters arrived in Kentucky, tensions with Native 
Americans increased, and white hunters began using skulking tactics in battle. 
The second chapter discusses the transition of the Kentucky militia during the 
American Revolution and the years immediately following the conflict. Kentuckians 
modified their tactics. Building fortifications enabled whites to occupy more land despite 
a limited population. In addition, Kentuckians adopted the horse for use in battle. The 
benefits of the horse became apparent in the years after the Revolutionary War when 





The third chapter examines the battle record of the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers 
in the Northwest Indian War of the 1790s. Kentuckians participated in four campaigns 
during Northwest Indian War. The campaigns of 1790, led by General Josiah Harmar, 
and 1791, led by General Arthur St. Clair, ended in disastrous defeat. The third operation 
consisted of raids led by General Charles Scott and General James Wilkinson that 
destroyed many villages and food supplies with minimal casualties on both sides. The 
fourth offensive, led by General Anthony Wayne, ended in a decisive victory for the 
United States, but Kentuckians played a minor role in the campaigns lone battle. The 
outcome of these offensives was largely determined by the commanding officers’ 
methods of preparation. The chapter ends with the signing of the Treaty of Greenville in 
1795, following Wayne’s 1794 victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. 
The fourth chapter is an overview of the Kentuckians’ participation in three 
operations in the war of 1812: the winter offensive of 1812-1813, the late summer 
invasion of Upper Canada in 1813, and the Battle of New Orleans. The winter campaign 
of 1812-1813 ended in defeat. The Battle of New Orleans ended in victory for the United 
States, but Andrew Jackson berated Kentuckians for cowardice on the battlefield. 
Jackson’s critique initiated a series of arguments between the general and Kentucky 
leaders in the decade after the War of 1812. Kentuckians’ lone success during the War of 
1812 was the summer offensive in 1813 when mounted Kentuckians under the command 
of Colonel Richard Mentor Johnson harassed the vanguard of the retreating British forces 






 The fifth chapter explores the role of memory in elevating the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers to mythological status as the force most capable of ending Indian threats. 
Kentuckians developed a collective memory of the conflicts by attending public 
gatherings such as Washington’s Birthday and the Fourth of July where speakers 
remembered victories over their enemies in the Northwest Indian War and the War of 
1812 by the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers and eulogized about those who died in battle 
during these campaigns. At these gatherings, people witnessed militia parades followed 
by speakers who honored American and Kentucky heroes and implored listeners to model 
their behavior on these men. In the process, Kentuckians constructed an identity that 
































KENTUCKIANS LEARN HUNTING AND THE INDIAN WAY OF WAR 1768-1777 
 
Learning the Indian Way of War 
The opening of Kentucky to white settlement took place after the signing of the 1768 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Prior to the treaty, the British king, George III, forbade white 
settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The 
Six Nation Iroquois League and British Indian Superintendent Sir William Johnson 
negotiated the treaty drawing on the old Covenant Chain alliance between the British and 
Iroquois that had existed for over a century and a half by the time of the 1768 agreement.9 
The Iroquois Confederation and Johnson argued that the Iroquois controlled Kentucky by 
right of conquest, and used a claim considered by the Shawnee as the basis of the treaty.10 
The terms between Johnson and the Iroquois declared the land between the Ohio and 
Tennessee Rivers open for white settlement. The Cherokee and Shawnee strongly 
objected to the agreement. Kentucky was their hunting ground, and they did not 
recognize Iroquois claims to the territory.11 The Cherokee and Shawnee argued that a 
person, town, or nation could not claim land if they did not use the territory. They used 
the land for hunting, and argued that the Iroquois did not have a right to sell the territory. 
The fraudulent nature of the agreement sparked three decades of conflict between whites 
                                                 
9 Francis Jennings, "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, no. 2 (April 1971): 88-89; Jon William Parmenter, "Pontiac's War: Forging New 
Links in the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain, 1758-1766," Ethnohistory, no. 4 (Autumn 1997).  
10 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1998), 114. 
11 The Cherokee strongly objected because they signed the Treaty of Hard Labor of 1768 that relinquished 
claims to their hunting grounds west of the Allegheny Mountains. Because of this treaty, the Cherokee 





and Native Americans in the Ohio Country that ended with an American victory at the 
Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. 
 After the 1768 agreement, white settlers began entering Kentucky in larger 
numbers. They found a landscape full of game but they lacked the hunting skills to 
effectively support themselves while they cleared land for farming. To survive, white 
hunters adopted Indian hunting techniques, clothing, and technology.12 Whites in the 
West needed to learn these skills before they established farms to grow their own food. In 
the process, whites began to resemble Native Americans closely in their dress and 
dependence on hunting wild game rather than farming. 
Indians were expert hunters who began learning their techniques from the age of 
twelve. By the time whites began arriving in the Ohio Country, Indian hunters had spent 
generations refining their methods, and improved their skills with the addition of 
European technology. Indian men went on annual long hunts during which they taught 
the younger generation the skulking skills necessary to track prey and develop the 
endurance to travel long distances on minimal food. The physical demands of the long 
hunt has led historian Armstrong Starkey to argue that Native American warriors 
possessed the skills, endurance, and discipline of modern military commandos.13 
Native Americans did not draw a sharp distinction between hunting and warfare; 
they trained to achieve mastery in both. Young Indian men took their training quite 
seriously because it allowed them to demonstrate their manhood. Hunting also enabled 
young men show respect to village elders by providing meat to those no longer able to 
                                                 
12 Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost : The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry 
Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5, 8, 23. 





hunt for themselves.14 Native American hunting skills – their ability to move stealthily 
through the forest, track animals, and shoot accurately – proved useful in times of war. 
After the introduction of the flintlock musket, Indian hunters learned to aim precisely and 
maintain their weapons on long hunts. They soon transferred these skills to the realm of 
warfare. White settlers to the Ohio Country emulated the tactics of what Patrick Malone 
calls the skulking way of war: quick raids, ambushes, tactical retreats, and the avoidance 
of open battles.15 White hunters employed these tactics as they transitioned from hunting 
to conquering land claimed by Native Americans. 
When Daniel Boone, George Rogers Clark, and their peers entered Kentucky, 
they found a landscape they considered pristine for settling and hunting, but ignored the 
inhabitants’ claims to the land.16 Less experienced in hunting, white settlers emulated 
Native American tactics to hunt more effectively.17 The hunters also began wearing 
Indian clothing and moccasins because they found them superior to European-made 
clothing for frontier conditions.18 White hunters especially prized moccasins because they 
dried more quickly than European-made shoes did.19 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Indian hunting culture adopted by white 
settlers was the choice of leaders by hunting parties. Whites adopted Indian hunting 
                                                 
14 Aron, West was Lost, 8, 21. 
15 Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War : Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians 
(Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991), 10. 
16 Aron, West was Lost, 22-23 
17 Ibid, 23 
18 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 19. 
19 Aron, West Was Lost, 23; Stephen Aron, "'Rights in the Woods' on the Trans-Appalachian Frontier," in 
Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750-1830, ed. Andrew R. 
L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 103-04; John 






techniques and clothing because they could not immediately transform the landscape 
immediately into one suitable for raising crops and livestock.20 But white settlers selected 
their leaders based on their hunting skills rather than their social position. Such men led 
fellow hunters at the pleasure of the company and were replaced if the hunting party 
believed another man more capable.21 Kentuckians abandoned leaders if they did not 
inspire confidence among the ranks, a practice followed in the warfare of the 1770s and 
1780s. George Rogers Clark’s Kentucky militia, for example, abandoned him during his 
1786 Wabash campaign.22 White settlers also followed young Native Americans in using 
their exploits in hunting and warfare as an opportunity to demonstrate their manhood to 
their peers. White hunters, like Native Americans, viewed hunting as an arena in which 
they could demonstrate their masculinity.23 However, the similarities between white and 
Indian hunting techniques, dress, and leadership choices, stark differences remained. 
White hunters strove to maintain their European identity and constructed a white-
dominated culture in the West.24 
The Kentucky frontier was an ideal place for eastern yeoman farmers who longed 
for prosperity.25 Scarcity of land, conflict with religious and civil authorities, and a desire 
for economic opportunities to improve their economic standing pushed settlers out of 
                                                 
20 Aron, West Was Lost, 13-15. 
21 Aron, West Was Lost, 33-34; Brent Altsheler, “The Long Hunters and James Knox Their Leader,” Filson 
Club Historical Quarterly no. 5 (October 1931), 169-75; Faragher, Daniel Boone, 24; Lyman Copeland 
Draper, “Life of Boone,” Lyman Copeland Draper Manuscripts, (University of Wisconsin, Madison 
Wisconsin), 3B, 64-65.  
22 Richard G. Stone, A Brittle Sword : The Kentucky Militia, 1776-1912 (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1977), 15. 
23 Aron, West was Lost, 8, 21, 25-26. 
24 Ibid, 23-24., Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 128. 





Virginia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania to Kentucky.26 Hunting provided whites with 
their initial food supplies and animal skins that they sold to traders for the tools they 
needed to build farms in Kentucky. As they established homesteads, white settlers 
adopted the technology and tactics of Indians that helped them produce items they could 
trade or sell. 
As the whites improved their hunting skills, they became increasingly 
knowledgeable in frontier warfare. Improved accuracy with muskets and enhanced 
tracking ability made them proficient at the skulking tactics of Indian warfare. Like their 
Native American counterparts, white hunters began to participate in long hunts that lasted 
for months or years at a time. Backcountry men left their wives to tend to the farms and 
families while they participated in these long hunts. Like Indian hunter-warriors, they 
chose the Pennsylvania or Kentucky long rifle as their preferred weapon. 27 Frontier 
settlements and long hunts served as the training ground where white frontiersmen 
refined their skills. Whites and Native Americans became bitter enemies to the dismay of 
whites on the Atlantic seaboard, but they also strongly resembled one another.28 
As the number of whites who hunted and established farms rose in the West, 
violence between whites and Native Americans increased. The level of brutality grew in 
part because settlers made no distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. The 
ruthlessness of white soldiers regularly appalled their Native American allies and 
enemies, whether during King Philip’s War in seventeenth century New England, 
                                                 
26 Nancy O’Malley, “Frontier Defenses and Pioneer Strategies in the Historic Settlement Era,” The Buzzle 
about Kentuck: Settling the Promised Land, Craig Friend, ed., (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1999), 59. 
27 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 126-127. 





Pontiac’s Rebellion in in the mid-eighteenth century, or the Northwest Indian Wars of the 
late eighteenth century. The willingness of white soldiers to kill non-combatants 
dismayed Indians who were more likely to take prisoners to replace the people they lost 
in combat. As white encroachment into Kentucky increased, Indian warriors responded in 
kind and began killing noncombatants to stop white incursions. Europeans, in turn, 
justified further attacks on Indian noncombatants by arguing that they fought a savage 
enemy. The horrific nature of the warfare in Kentucky led frontiersmen to hate Indians, 
encouraging them to pursue a war of extirpation.29 Stories about the merciless behavior of 
Native Americans in Kentucky, including attacks on women and children, soon spread 
throughout the United States, carried by newspapers and travelers.30 
Along the eastern seaboard, the Revolutionary War focused on the independence 
of the United States, but the fighting in Kentucky soon became a racial conflict between 
whites and Native Americans over control of Kentucky. In the 1760s, the Shawnee 
allowed white hunters to live in Kentucky, but those days came to an end in the 1770s as 
whites increased in number and began farming the land.31 When white hunters began 
settling and modifying the landscape, the Shawnee tried to stem the tide of white 
settlement.32 But the number of whites entering Kentucky during the Revolutionary War 
proved too great for the Shawnee to remove. 
Revolutionary War 
                                                 
29 Grenier, The First Way of War, 19. 
30 Silver’s work details press reports out of western Pennsylvania to track the development of Indian-hating 
attitudes among whites;Peter Rhoads Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early 
America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). 
31 Aron, West was Lost, 17-19; Aron, “Rights in the Woods,” 187-88; Draper, “Life of Boone,” Draper 
Manuscripts, 3B47-60. 
32 Aron, “Rights in the Woods,” 187; Richard White, The Middle Ground : Indians, Empires, and 





In 1775, the political loyalties of most western settlers were complicated and unclear. 
Daniel Boone, for example, did not fight for American independence but for the 
expansion of white settlement against Native Americans who sought to retain their land.33 
However, when the British began to arm and advise Indians in 1778, whites regardless of 
previous political allegiances, fought together against Indians in an increasingly violent 
race war.34 When the British decided to arm Native Americans to remove patriot 
influences in Kentucky, whites reacted by uniting against the British who allied 
themselves to the Indians. Settlers formed the Kentucky Militia to fight Native 
Americans and their British allies.35 
In 1777, the Kentucky settlements of Boonesborough, Saint Asaph’s, and 
Harrodsburg held their first formal muster of 144 men.36 Militia service enabled hunters 
to demonstrate their knowledge of the skulking way of war in battle.37 However, many 
leaders in the Kentucky militia struggled to implement skulking tactics failed to advance 
their forces with the same caution as Indian warriors. Kentuckians had learned most 
facets of the skulking way of war, but they lacked the same level of caution as their 
enemies. Whites who desired to display their masculinity in battle were overly aggressive 
and walked into numerous ambushes. They struggled with what historian John Faragher 
calls “fool-brave,” with many officers fearing that a comrade would raise questions about 
their manhood if they failed to attack.38 Their Indian enemies admired bravery, but 
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deplored rashness. They therefore avoided bloody frontal assaults and sought to envelop 
an enemy while leaving a retreat route to avoid costly battles.39 
The most successful American commander to apply the Indian tactics in battle 
against the British was George Rogers Clark, who invaded the Illinois Country in 1778. 
He launched an invasion of Illinois with the stated objective of protecting Kentucky 
settlements from Indian attack, despite the fact that the greatest threat to the Kentuckians 
was the Shawnee in the Ohio Country. He also sought a river route to advance on the key 
British base at Detroit.40 He believed that if American forces captured Detroit, they could 
sever the supply of British weapons going to the Shawnee and their enemy would have a 
finite supply of ammunition and weaponry. 
In July 1778, Clark’s force captured Kaskaskia, which offered access to the 
Wabash River and enabled American forces to advance on Detroit. In response to the 
capture of Kaskaskia, British Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton seized the post of 
Vincennes on the Wabash River, which blocked the river route to Detroit. Clark and his 
men understood frontier warfare and traveled the 250 miles to Vincennes without 
marching into an ambush. They soon besieged Hamilton at Vincennes, captured the 
British commander, and sent him back to Virginia as a war criminal. Clark’s irregular 
tactics and his rough treatment of British prisoners, particularly Hamilton, contributed to 
the image of Kentuckians as savages whose behavior and appearance resembled Indians 
more than whites. 
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In 1780, British commander Captain Henry Bird launched an invasion of 
Kentucky with 1,200 British regulars and Native warriors, and artillery, rendering settler 
forts and stations defenseless. The attack came after a particularly hard winter in 1779-80 
during which both the Shawnee and the settlers suffered because of the destruction of 
their crops in the summer and fall campaigns of 1779. Bird’s invasion quickly overcame 
two Kentucky stations and collected plunder and prisoners from each. He was forced to 
withdraw, however, when his Indian warriors refused to attack additional posts. They 
believed they had achieved their objectives of retaliating against the Kentuckians who 
caused suffering the previous winter.41 Bird’s invasion demonstrated that British and 
Indian forces could attack Kentucky virtually at will as long as the British maintained 
control of Detroit. But it also demonstrates that Native Americans fought for their own 
objectives which differed from those of their European allies. 
In response to Bird’s invasion, Clark led almost 1,000 Kentuckians against 
Shawnee towns in Ohio. The Shawnee retreated in the face of the overwhelming 
numbers, enabling Clark and the Kentuckians to burn the village of Chillicothe. 
According to an American report, the Shawnee suffered seventy three dead. Clark’s 
invasion burned Shawnee homes and crops, leaving the Indians impoverished. But he was 
unable to conquer the Shawnee and his own force’s logistical shortcomings forced Clark 
to withdraw. The Shawnees’ cautious retreat helped them preserve their independence 
until 1794.42 
On August 19, 1782, Kentuckians displayed a fool-brave attitude when they were 
ambushed by a primarily Indian force. During the summer of 1782, Kentuckians suffered 
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numerous Indian raids. In August, an Indian-British force lay siege to Bryan’s Station, 
and 182 men from neighboring settlements, including forty-five men under Boone’s 
command, rushed to its relief. When the force arrived they discovered that the enemy had 
retreated. The officers debated whether they should pursue the enemy immediately or 
wait for the arrival of several hundred reinforcements. Hugh McGary, one of the officers 
involved in the discussion, suggested they wait. In response, his men insulted and 
silenced him with scornful references to his timidity. Kentuckians began their pursuit the 
next day, following a trail that led to Blue Licks where they saw a few Indians walking 
about casually on top of the hill. McGary and Boone recognized the obvious signs of an 
ambush. But McGary, still suffering from the previous day’s insults to his manhood, 
remained silent, while Boone’s men silenced him quickly with taunts of cowardice when 
he briefly spoke up. McGary’s force, without orders, rushed toward the Native 
Americans on top of the hill, with Boone’s men following closely on their heels. 
However, a war party hidden in the ravine on the opposite bank ambushed the 
Kentuckians and forced them to retreat.43 The rashness of the Kentuckians led to their 
defeat. The leaders of the militia, who led at the pleasure of their company, conceded to 
the demands of men overly confident in their woodland skills and who sought to kill or 
remove all natives from Kentucky.44 The defeat at Blue Licks demonstrated the inability 
of the Kentuckians to prevent and retaliate effectively against Indian raids on isolated 
settlements. To prevent future depredations, Kentuckians changed their tactics by 
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building stations and fortifications to provide a place where settlers could take cover 




































                                                 









ADAPTING THE INDIAN WAY OF WAR: 1778-1786 
 
In the 1780s, Kentuckians adopted new tactics against the Ohio Indians to help 
them hold conquered territory and expand into new land without suffering large losses in 
battle. While the Eastern Seaboard lived in relative peace following the American 
Revolution, Kentuckians and the Ohio Indians continued fighting for another decade as 
whites continued to move onto land in Kentucky and Ohio later. In response to increasing 
casualties, Kentuckians employed additional tactics in addition to those they had learned 
from the Indians. First, they built a series of defensive fortifications called stations and 
forts that helped them occupy new territory and control to the land. Stations enabled 
Kentuckians to occupy new land despite their small population, especially before 1783. 
Second, Kentuckians’ widespread use of horses the second half of the 1780s allowed 
them to attack Ohio Indian villages as far north as the Great Lakes. The second 
adaptation came after the population of Kentucky expanded and settlers could mount 
sustained offensives against the Ohio Indians. 
Between 1778 and 1782, Kentuckians built fifty-seven new stations.46 Many of 
the settlers who moved into the Ohio Valley lacked legal title to their land.47 The 
Shawnee still claimed most of Kentucky. Moreover, land speculators began investing 
heavily in Kentucky, leading settlers to complain that “a set of Nabobs in Virginia 
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purchased the best land,” but were unwilling to help pay for necessary defenses.48 Settlers 
squatted on land claimed by the national government or private owners in Virginia. They 
did not consider their actions illegal, however, because they based their claims on 
occupancy and improvement, or homesteading. 49 Because settlers occupied land that 
both the Virginia gentry and Native Americans claimed they made enemies of both 
groups.50 As the violence increased, Kentuckians turned to speculators, on whose land 
they squatted, for military assistance, but their pleas for assistance remained unanswered 
because their occupation of the land remained legally questionable.51 
The yeoman farmers who migrated to Kentucky stood on the lower rungs of 
eastern society and sought greater prosperity.52 In the East, they faced scarcity of land, 
rigid civil authorities, and limited opportunities to improve their economic standing. 
These conditions pushed settlers from Virginia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania to 
Kentucky driving the region’s population boom for the next two decades.53 The settlers 
who arrived in Kentucky in the 1770s and 1780s began the process of transforming a 
landscape modified by Indians for hunting into a region suitable for farming. The earliest 
settlers established homesteads in the Bluegrass region in the 1770s and in the Green 
River region in the late 1780s. They chose these areas because of the abundance of 
vegetation, which they believed as an indicated of high soil quality.54 
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As settlers arrived in Kentucky in greater numbers, two distinctive defensive 
fortifications appeared: stations and forts. These structures acted as outposts for whites 
moving into Kentucky and enabled them to occupy more territory claimed by Indians, 
and thus were used as offensive structures. But they also sparked more violence in the 
1780s and 1790s, including the Northwest Indian War of 1790 to 1794. The stations and 
forts also enabled recently arrived settlers to learn military tactics from whites who had 
arrived the previous decade. 
In the first nine months of 1781, Indians killed or captured 131 people in 
Kentucky. During the Revolutionary War, the small population of Kentuckians could not 
guard or retaliate against every Indian raid. Offensives required a significant number of 
men and often led to high casualties, as during the ambush at Blue Licks. To limit 
casualties and retain their conquered territory, settlers built fortified structures. The roles 
of settlers varied depending on their gender and age. During Indian attacks, men first 
defended against the raiders while their families sought shelter in the station. Sometimes, 
women helped their husbands fight off their attackers, demonstrating their capability with 
firearms, but only took part in the fighting when their homes were directly under attack.55 
Before the American victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, Kentuckians occupied land 
in Kentucky by clearing it, planting crops, and then building fortifications to defend 
against Indian attacks.56 These structures gave Kentuckians time to increase their 
numbers and prepare for future larger offensives against Indian villages north of the Ohio 
River. 
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Forts were large, communally occupied structures with a stockade enclosure to 
provide safety for the inhabitants. Stations were defensible residential sites. Settlers built 
a cabin or several cabins that provided refuge in the event of an Indian raid. They were 
not as defensible as forts because a family was typically isolated, but settlers could 
increase a station’s safety by building several cabins together. Despite the ongoing 
violence, settlers preferred stations to the forts because they lived closer to their land and 
could continue to improve and clear it. Stations also offered better and less crowded 
living conditions than forts. Settlers built their stations close to fresh water, both to ensure 
a ready supply of water, and to help farmers transport their goods to markets. Forts 
offered a refuge for newly arrived settlers until they claimed their own homesteads in 
Kentucky.57 These structures enabled Kentuckians to develop more land without regular 
militia raids into the Ohio Country. Still, such raids became more frequent in the late 
1780s Kentucky’s settler population grew.58 
While stations and forts offered short-term protection from raids by Indians, 
settlers remained vulnerable because Native Americans attacked their fields. When 
warriors successfully destroyed a crop, the inhabitants of forts and stations faced dire 
conditions. The winter of 1779-80 was particularly difficult on the residents of Fort 
Boonesborough because Native Americans destroyed their fields. As one settlers noted, 
Indian raids “reduced many of us so low that we have scarce cattle amongst us to supply 
our small Family’s.” 59 The raids had a dramatic effect on the price of food, with corn 
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reaching $100 a bushel, and salt, used to preserve meat, rising to $500 a bushel.60 The 
destruction of the crops required men to provide for their families with their guns. But a 
prolonged cold snap between November and February killed game and many of the 
surviving animals offered little sustenance. 
Forts and stations provided settlers with a degree of safety and enabled them to 
begin improving land and building farms. The fortifications helped the small number of 
settlers – who numbered approximately 5,000 in 1777 and 8,000 by 1782 – to maintain 
their hold on the land without retaliating against every Indian raid. As the American 
Revolution drew to a close, the population of Kentucky grew exponentially. In 1783, the 
settler population rose to 12,000 inhabitants, nearly tripled to 30,000 in 1784, and by the 
time of the first federal census in 1790 had reached to 73,677.61 
The system of stations and forts developed in Kentucky during and shortly after 
the Revolutionary War helped Kentucky’s settler population claim new territory and 
withstand raids by the Ohio Indians.62 The structures helped Kentuckians push into new 
territory beyond the Bluegrass. As settlers moved closer to the Ohio River, the Shawnee 
modified their tactics and raided more sparsely populated northern settlements. Lexington 
and the Bluegrass region began to enjoy relative safety and inhabitants enjoyed some 
luxury items. In areas where the threat of Indian attack fell, outposts transitioned into 
large estates and new, larger industries moved into Lexington.63 
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But expanded white settlement in Kentucky increased tensions in the West.64 
Though inhabitants in Lexington enjoyed greater safety, frontier settlements faced 
continued Shawnee raids designed protect their homelands and hunting grounds from 
white settlers.65 In response, the Confederation government began negotiating with 
western Indian nations in December 1784. But with each passing year, the negotiations 
grew more contentious. The earliest meeting at Fort McIntosh, Pennsylvania, ended with 
positive feelings, but the Shawnee did not attend these negotiation.66 A year later, George 
Rogers Clark headed a delegation of Kentuckians who met with Native Americans at Fort 
Finney to prevent further raiding. 67 But negotiations proved contentious and one 
frustrated Shawnee delegate threw down both black and wampum belts – white 
representing peace and black signifying war – because of the lack of progress.68 Despite 
these difficulties, the Shawnee signed a treaty with the Kentuckians on January 31, 1786 
that called an end to attacks. But neither the Kentuckians nor the Shawnee observed the 
treaty and both sides continued to raid one another.69 
By 1784, a growing settler population and relative peace in the Bluegrass gave 
rise to a horse culture that enabled Kentuckians to improve their military tactics. Horses 
enabled settlers to move more quickly and travel further through the frontier to attack 
                                                 
64 White, The Middle Ground, 418-19. 
65 Nichols, Red Gentlemen, 63-64, 74. 
66 Draper, “Harmar’s Diary,” 4 December, 1784, Draper Manuscripts, 1W: 31-32; Gifford, The Northwest 
Indian War, 34 
67 12 November 1785, 21 December 1785, Ebenezer Denny and Josiah Harmar, Military Journal of Major 
Ebenezer Denny, an Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars (Philadelphia, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, 1859), (hereafter HSPA), 266, 268. 
68 John Anthony Caruso, The Great Lakes Frontier: An Epic of the Old Northwest (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1961), 102-103. 





Indian villages.70 Settlers of Kentucky recognized the importance of the horse in the 
economic development of the region and as in Virginia they began the view horse 
ownership as a marker of social status.71 The use of horses enabled Kentuckians to 
conduct raids from a week to a month long, destroy numerous Indian villages and food 
supplies, and return to Kentucky quickly so that men could tend to their fields. Using 
horses in the 1780s, Kentuckians developed a regular pattern of mounted campaigns 
against the Ohio Country Indians.72 Kentuckians came to value their horses so highly that 
many refused to go to war if they could not go into battle mounted.73 The horse proved 
essential both to Kentucky’s economic development and militia’s offensive capability. 
Horses permitted settlers to expand beyond the Bluegrass region into northern Kentucky 
and to counter the Indian raids that these frontier settlements suffered. 
Two examples demonstrate the growing importance of the horse both to 
Kentuckians and Native Americans in the Trans-Appalachian West. In 1778, the 
Shawnee took Simon Kenton prisoner while he conducted a horse stealing expedition. 
Kenton was a white hunter who in 1774 had served as a scout for the Virginia militia 
during Lord Dunmore’s War. After his release by the Shawnee, he joined George Rogers 
Clark’s 1778 expedition to capture Fort Sackville. While a captive, Kenton endured days 
of ritual torture, including running a gauntlet six times. Kenton recalled a conversation 
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with his captors in which they explained that they planned to put Kenton to death because 
he attempted to steal their horses: 
“[Interrogator] Young man, did you know it was wrong to steal 
Indians’ horses?” [Kenton] No, I did not, for you come and steal 
our horses. [Interrogator] Don’t you know the Great Spirit don’t 
love people that steal? No – did you ever know it? [Kenton] Yes, 
20 years ago. . . .He then whipped me pretty smartly, and told me 
that it was for stealing Indians’ horses.74 
 
Kenton was transported to the British at Detroit after days of ritual torture. In Detroit, he 
plotted his escape and returned to Kentucky to fight alongside Clark.75 
The interaction between Kenton and his captors reveals the growing importance 
of horses in the Trans-Appalachian West, both to Native Americans and Kentuckians. It 
also highlights the increasing violence in the West. The Shawnee captured far more white 
prisoners, particularly adult males, and tried to integrate them into their own society to 
replace Indians who died fighting. The Shawnee revealed their willingness to execute 
Kenton when they gave him the adoptive name Cutta-ho-tha, or Blackened or 
Condemned Man. The Shawnees’ need for horses changed their tactics and increased the 
level of violence they employed to resist white expansion onto their homelands. 
As the horse grew in importance for Kentuckians, Native Americans began 
stealing horses from isolated stations and homesteads. The Ohio Indians recognized the 
threat posed by mounted Kentuckians and when they raided lightly settled northern 
settlements, they regularly stole horses. A 1786 report to Congress estimated that raiders 
had stolen seven hundred horses and killed thirty people in Kentucky in the first half of 
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the year.76 Judge Harry Innes, who served as an assistant judge of the Supreme Court 
Judicature of the Kentucky district between 1782 and 1784 and the attorney general 
between 1784 and 1789, estimated in July 1790 that warriors killed or captured fifteen 
hundred people and stole twenty thousand horses from Kentuckians between 1783 and 
1789.77 The large number of horses Shawnee stole from Kentuckians in this seven-year 
period reveal their fear of mounted settler raids. 
The Kentucky militia adopted the horse because it allowed frontiersmen to 
increase the range of their offensives and attack unsuspecting villages near the Great 
Lakes. Horses enabled the militiaman to move more quickly and to carry more 
ammunition and rations than on foot. The 1786 Wabash expedition by Kentuckians 
demonstrated the need for militia leadership to inspire confidence in their men. It also 
revealed how the horse made it possible for Kentuckians to raze numerous villages in a 
short time.78 Clark, the leader of the Wabash campaign, planned a two-pronged attack. 
One, led by Clark, moved toward the Miami towns in the Wabash Country; the other, 
under the command of Benjamin Logan, marched against the Shawnee towns.79 After 
arriving in Kentucky, Logan learned the skills of hunting, and his exploits helped him 
achieve the rank of colonel in the Kentucky militia. Clark’s force disintegrated, but 
Logan’s troops successfully reached their objective against the Shawnee. His force took 
twenty-six women and children prisoner, rescued four white captives, and took the scalps 
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of eleven warriors, ten chiefs, and several women and children.80 Logan’s men attacked 
the village of Mequachake despite the American flag that flew above it. The village chief, 
Molunthy, held up a treaty he had signed with the Confederation government signifying 
the village was at peace with the United States. Kentuckians ignored his claims and he 
“was burnt and blown up [by] gunpowder set all around him in small bags.”81 
The Logan attack reveals the tactical changes embraced by Kentucky militia in 
the 1780s. First, Kentuckians used horses to reach the villages along the Great Miami 
River, demonstrating that such northern outposts were no longer out of their reach. 
Second, the raid and murder of Chief Molunthy highlighted the heightened level of 
violence. Kentuckians killed Molunthy because they believed all Indians posed a threat to 
them and their exploitation of the land. By the 1780, Kentuckians embraced a racial war 
designed to extirpate the Ohio Indians. 
The late 1770s and 80s witnessed an evolution in the military tactics of 
Kentuckians. They adopted new methods of war and combined them with tactics they had 
learned in the 1770s. The system of stations and fortifications bought Kentuckians time 
when they lacked the population to launch offensive operations into the Ohio Country. 
These structures offered protection to new arrivals while enabling settlers to occupy 
additional land with less risk. In the 1780s, Kentuckians also explored and refined the use 
of the horse in wilderness fighting. By 1786, militia raids Kentuckians demonstrated that 
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Indian villages as for north as the Great Miami River were not out of their reach. In the 
next decade, Kentuckians expanded their ranges and attacked villages even further to the 
north. 82 
In 1789, the new national government began to take shape to replace the 
Confederation government and George Washington became the first president of the U.S. 
under the new Constitution. The small federal military presence in the Ohio Country of 
518 men scattered along several hundred mile stretch of the Ohio River in 1787, did little 
to deter either the Kentuckians or the Indians from raiding.83 At Washington’s behest, the 
new federal government sent peace envoys, but the repeated raids by Kentuckians and 
Native Americans tested the powers of the new federal government. By 1790, a full-scale 
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THE KENTUCKIANS IN THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR 1790-1794 
 
 The Confederation government failed to negotiate an end to the violence between 
the Kentuckians and Ohio Indians, forcing the newly organized federal government to 
attempt to negotiate a peace. 85 Secretary of War Henry Knox supported the efforts of the 
new government to negotiate peace with the Ohio Indians. He supported peace because 
the government owed an enormous debt after the American Revolution. However, the 
federal government found it difficult to bring an end to the violence because Kentuckians 
repeatedly raided Indian towns in the Ohio Country regardless of their allegiance to the 
United States. Kentuckians’ constant attacks on enemy and friendly villages and their 
unwillingness to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants revealed that they 
sought a war of extirpation.86 Arthur St. Clair, the governor of the Northwest Territory, 
described the escalation of the violence and Kentuckians’ growing hatred of Native 
Americans. Kentuckians, he wrote, were “in the habit of retaliation . . . without attending 
precisely to the nations from which the injuries are received.”87 In 1789, shortly after 
George Washington’s inauguration, Knox wrote to the president: 
In examining the question how the disturbances on the frontiers are to be 
quieted, two modes present themselves, by which the object might perhaps 
be effected; the first of which is by raising an army, and extirpating the 
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refractory tribes entirely, or secondly by forming treaties of peace with 
them, in which their rights and limits should be explicitly defined, and the 
treaties observed on the part of the United States with the most rigid 
justice, by punishing the whites, who should violate the same.88 
 
 
Knox thought efforts to negotiate peace in the Trans-Appalachian west would be 
defeated by the continual raids and killings by Kentuckians and Native Americans. 
Reprisal and revenge had occurred for so long and were so intermingled that the federal 
government could not assign blame for the hostilities to one side.89 In 1789, Knox 
ordered Brigadier-General Josiah Harmar to organize a campaign against the Shawnee 
and Miami Nations. Harmar had served under Washington during the Revolutionary War, 
and had written that Harmar was “personally known to me as some of the best officers 
who were in the Army.”90 After the war, Harmar oversaw the U.S. forces in the Trans-
Appalachian West in the forts along the Ohio River. To attack the Shawnee and Miami, 
the U.S. needed to increase its western force from approximately six hundred to twenty-
five hundred soldiers at a cost of $200,000. This sum was more than the nation could 
afford as it attempted to pay off its debts from the Revolutionary War.91 
President Washington believed a cash-strapped federal government could succeed 
if Harmar led a combined regular army and militia force on the Miami and Shawnee 
towns along the Maumee River. American leaders viewed these Indians as the primary 
agitators.92 Washington’s decision to include the militia in the campaign placed Harmar 
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in a difficult position. As Harmar bluntly stated: “No person can hold a more 
contemptible opinion of the Militia in general than I do.”93 Harmar’s low opinion of the 
militia was shared by many regular army officers, including St. Clair, and General “Mad” 
Anthony Wayne, both of whom commanded later campaigns in the Ohio Valley. Wayne, 
commander of the 1792-1794 offensive against the Ohio Indians, rose to prominence 
during the American Revolution. He earned his moniker “Mad” in 1779 after a 
resounding victory over British forces at Stony Point in which American troops used only 
bayonets. During the Revolution, regular officers frequently saw the militia retreat from 
battle and cause the death of regular troops. They also witnessed Kentuckians disregard 
the treaties the U.S. government negotiated with the Indian nations of Ohio. 
Moreover, in the 1790s the officers and enlisted men of the militia enjoyed more 
economic and political success. Nearly 40 percent of militia officers owned slaves, and 
with an average of more than six slaves per household. In addition, nearly 14 percent of 
militia officers held political office in the U.S. Congress, Kentucky House of 
Representatives, Kentucky State Senate, or as governor between 1790 and 1811.94 
While enlisted men did not possess as much wealth as militia officers, 9 percent 
of enlisted men owned slaves, with an average of four slaves per household. Sixteen 
percent of enlisted men owned land, and 30 percent owned at least one horse. Politically, 
only two won election to the state House of Representatives and none held office at the 
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national level. Wealthy enlisted men – those who owned land or slaves – could hire 
substitutes for the campaigns in which they did not wish to participate, especially if they 
were drafted into the militia as foot soldiers.95 
Regardless of their economic wealth or political influence, Kentucky men still 
served in the militia. They fought in part because local newspapers regularly ran stories 
that described Indian raids on Kentucky settlements. As a result, they believed their 
families and towns were not safe from attack. Also, the militia provided a place for men 
to display courage, bravery, and masculinity on the battlefield. Men who desired higher 
social and economic standing in the martial society of Kentucky saw an opportunity to 
advance themselves by fighting in the militia. However, such men embraced mounted 
service and refused to participate when drafted as foot soldiers. Many waited to serve in 
campaigns in which they could fight mounted. 
Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne realized that they needed militia to augment their 
forces because they could not recruit enough regular troops. When federal officers 
understood that Kentuckians wanted to ride into battle mounted under militia officers 
they respected, they were able to recruit the best militiamen.96 In addition, mounted 
militia received eighteen dollars a month salary for their service compared to foot 
soldiers who received three dollars a month. Money served as a practical motivator to 
fight mounted.97 Kentuckians also resented being drafted into the militia because they 
wished to volunteer for campaigns on their own terms, and as mounted soldiers. 
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American commanders often drafted foot soldiers because they were less expensive than 
mounted soldiers. Harmar and St. Clair’s both suffered defeats because they decided to 
draft foot militia who panicked when ambushed by Native Americans. 
General Josiah Harmar’s Campaign (Fall 1790) 
General Josiah Harmar’s campaign should have convinced American military and 
political leaders that they needed to recruit the best equipped troops if they were going to 
win in the Ohio Country.98 Harmar’s concern about the cost of the expedition resulted in 
his men receiving low quality weaponry, improper clothing, and insufficient food. In 
addition to these mistakes, Harmar called up foot militia instead of mounted militia to 
save money. Not enough Kentuckians answered Harmar’s call, which meant a draft was 
instituted. To add to Harmar’s problems, Colonel John Hardin was the highest ranking 
militia officer willing to lead the Kentuckians. Kentuckians disliked his rash temperament 
despite numerous exploits against the Ohio Indians in the prior decade. Kentuckians who 
wanted to fight on horseback did not report when drafted, but instead paid substitutes. 
The men who assembled at Ft. Washington, modern-day Cincinnati, were either old men 
or inexperienced boys.99 
Harmar faced another problem: minimal and incorrect intelligence about the 
Indian forces he faced. A raid ordered by Knox in April 1791 demonstrated the ignorance 
of federal leaders regarding the size and ability of the enemy they faced.100 To conquer 
                                                 
98 Congress, ASPMA, 1: 25-26, 34-35; Gifford, The Northwest Indian War, 106; Sword, President 
Washington’s Indian War, 115; Michael S. Warner, "General Josiah Harmar's Campaign Reconsidered: 
How the Americans Lost the Battle of Kekionga," Indiana Magazine of History, no. 8 (March 1987): 54. 
99 Gifford, The Northwest Indian War, 93; Nelson, “The Kentucky Mounted Volunteers,” 220-22; Stone, 
Brittle Sword, 24. 
100 Gifford, The Northwest Indian War, 93; Harry M. Ward, Charles Scott and the "Spirit of '76" 





the small band of warriors, which he estimated at two hundred, Knox ordered a small raid 
with a force of 100 regular soldiers and 200 volunteers. However, the Indian warriors 
numbered closer to two thousand.101 The small expedition succeeded in destroying 
several villages along the Scioto River and killed four Indians, but it could not stop 
Indian raids into Kentucky.102 In the spring of 1790, the small raid demonstrated to 
Harmar that he needed a larger and faster moving army to conduct an effective offensive 
against the Ohio Indians. But he could not persuade federal politicians to appropriate the 
money necessary for enough troops and equipment.103 
 Harmar requested a three thousand man army to attack Miami and Shawnee 
villages along the Maumee River.104 Washington and Knox recommended a force of 
2,500 regular troops, but Congress approved funds for only 1,200 regulars.105 As a result, 
Harmar relied on foot militia to fill the army’s ranks.106 Washington sent letters to county 
lieutenants across the nation to organize local militias and assist Harmar “to mediate any 
incursions against the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania.” 107 But men did not answer 
Washington’s call for two reasons. First, westerners distrusted the federal government for 
what appeared to be its minimal effort to protect Kentucky’s settlers.108 Second, 
Kentuckians despised being drafted to fight as foot militia. 
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When too few men answered Harmar’s call to arms, he ordered a draft of foot 
militia. As a result, Harmar’s militia force consisted primarily of substitutes hired to 
stand in for those drafted109 Harmar’s decision to call up foot soldiers demonstrated his 
failure to understand the importance of horse culture among Kentuckians and their desire 
for glory by attacking Native Americans from horseback.110 In September, a dismayed 
Harmer and his officers viewed the militia for the first time. One officer noted, “They 
[the militia] appear to be raw and unused to the gun or woods.”111 
Harmar’s expeditionary force of 2,100 men departed Fort Washington on 
September 26, 1790. It consisted of four hundred regular troops, well short of the 1,200 
authorized by Congress, augmented by 1,700 militia, commanded by Colonel John 
Hardin.112 Harmar’s army moved quickly and the army reached the Miami villages close 
to the St. Mary, Maumee, and St. Joseph rivers by October 15.113 
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On October 18, after a conference with his officers, Harmar ordered Hardin to 
lead a mission of 180 men, consisting of 150 militia and 30 regular troops to investigate 
scout sightings of Indian warriors near Kekionga, one of the Miami villages close to the 
army. Harmar also directed the mission and to explore the Wea villages to the north as a 
potential site for launching a more aggressive offensive. Hoping to discover Indian 
scouts, Hardin marched at a quick pace, but his force soon fell into chaos and nearly a 
third of the militia deserted and headed back to camp.114 In his haste to locate the enemy, 
Hardin spread his remaining force out, separating regular troops from the militia. As 
Hardin approached Kekionga his army spread, over half a mile in a single file line, 
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Unknown to Hardin, Indians hid along both sides of the path he traveled waiting 
to ambush his force.115 When Hardin’s men came into range, the Indian warriors opened 
fire from both sides of the road, killing several men and causing the militia to panic and 
retreat in a disorderly fashion.116 Regular troops tried to form lines for a bayonet charge, 
but the militia’s retreat sabotaged their efforts and resulted in the death of twenty-two 
regulars.117 Eventually, two companies of regulars moving toward the battle helped 
Hardin control the militia. They formed a defensive line that waited for stragglers over 
the next few hours and then retired to camp.118  
 Harmar recognized that his force was insufficient to subdue the Ohio Indians and 
wanted to withdraw, but Hardin pleaded for another chance to redeem himself.119 Harmar 
reluctantly agreed after hearing reports from several scouts that hundreds of Indians had 
returned to the village of Kekionga.120 Harmar approved the mission, but gave the 
command of the force to a regular army officer, Major John Wyllys, while Harmar took 
command of the militia. 
Wyllys began the march on October 20 at nightfall, hoping to reach Kekionga by 
daybreak. As the army neared the village, Wyllys divided his force into three groups and 
planned to ambush Indians retreating from Kekionga. Hardin’s militia attacked the 
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eastern flank of the town, seeking to encircle it. Another force of regulars and militia 
moved around the western flank, with the main body of regular troops, and a company of 
Kentucky riflemen to drive the village’s inhabitants into the waiting American forces.121  
 
 
Almost immediately, the plan disintegrated. Warriors ambushed Hardin’s 
detachment as they crossed the Maumee River, sending his force pandemonium and 
preventing the other detachments from returning fire because they risked shooting their 
own men. Wyllys’s cavalry company and a company of riflemen came to the relief of 
Hardin and succeeded in driving back the initial ambush.122 With the support of Wyllys’s 
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cavalry and riflemen, Hardin’s militia resumed their advance, but another ambush 
awaited them after fording the river.123 Hardin and Wyllys’s troops did not recognize that 
the retreating warriors were drawing them into a larger ambush.124 The second ambush 
killed many of the advancing militiamen and they panicked again. Wyllys attempted to 
aid the militiamen again with the cavalry, but their state of disarray prevented his cavalry 
from assembling. In the chaos, a warrior shot Wyllys off his horse, fatally wounding him. 
When his men could not remount him, they ordered a retreat of the remaining soldiers 
and militia.125  
Harmar’s campaign represented a defeat for the United States. He recognized that 
the army in its current state could not defeat the Ohio Indians. His decision to retreat 
prevented an unmitigated disaster and saved hundreds of American lives. For all his 
shortcomings in organizing the expedition, Harmar recognized that the Native American 
force could easily overwhelm his army. His campaign provided insights to American 
commanders of later expeditions about how the enemy fought and enabled them to 
prevent future mistakes and ambushes. 
Harmar’s army returned to Fort Washington on October 24. His force had lost 129 
regular troops, along with fourteen officers and fifty-four militia. Most of the regular 
troops died when the militia retreated or sought cover after the ambushes.126 In the 
coming months, Harmar and Kentuckians exchanged jabs about who deserved blame for 
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the campaign’s defeat. In response to the failure, Washington and Knox began planning 
another offensive for the fall of 1791 under the command of Arthur St. Clair.127 In 
preparation for the 1791 campaign, St. Clair ordered the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers 
under Kentucky officers to raid Indian towns in the Ohio Country. He wanted them to 
destroy crops, capture prisoners, and intimidate Indian nations pursue peace. 
General Charles Scott Ouiatenon Raid and General James Wilkinson’s L’Anguille 
Raid (Summer 1791) 
General Charles Scott’s raid on Ouiatenon and General James Wilkinson’s raid on 
L’Anguille took place over a sixty day period. The Kentucky Mounted Volunteers 
captured more than fifty Indians and killed another fifty in the attacks. The organization 
and planning of these raids enabled Kentuckians to succeed. They were led by an officer 
they respected and they rode into battle. As a result, they reached villages deep in the 
Northwest and combined their horse skills with skulking tactics to destroy the Indian 
villages. These effective raids convinced a few Wea and Wabash bands to pursue peace 
with the United States. The raids sent a clear message to the Ohio Indians that their most 
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Knox ordered General Charles Scott, the commanding officer of the Kentucky 
militia, to conduct the raid on the Wabash village of Ouiatenon. He wanted to deter 
warriors living in the targeted villages from fighting against the United States during the 
fall offensives. Knox directed Scott to capture prisoners, gather intelligence, destroy 
villages, and keep the Indians off balance before the planned American offensive.128 He 
also ordered Scott not to take scalps. On May 15, 1,095 men left Frankfort riding for the 
collection of villages of Ouiatenon.129 Judge Harry Innes wrote enthusiastically as the 
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Kentucky Mounted Volunteers left, “a more choice body of men could not be raised in 
the United States–young–healthy–well armed–well mounted.”130 
 On May 24, Scott and the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers crossed the Ohio River 
into the Ohio Country. After eight days of riding through forests in heavy rainfall, Scott’s 
force was exhausted and had lost most of their provisions.131 But Scott’s knowledge of 
Indian tactics and the Northwest Territory paid off. He was able to deceive enemy scouts 
by first following Harmar’s path before he changed directions and attacked Ouiatenon. 
His subterfuge ensured most of Indian warriors were not in the towns when the 
Kentuckians arrived. 
Nonetheless, when the Kentuckians approached Ouiatenon on June 1, a lone scout 
warned the residents of the approaching cavalry force.132 Trying to redeem himself after 
the Harmar campaign, Scott acted quickly and dispatched Hardin and sixty men to 
capture the fleeing villagers and attack two small hunting villages. Meanwhile, Scott led 
the main body of his army to Ouiatenon.133 
When the Kentuckians arrived at Ouiatenon, they found the village lightly 
defended. An Indian army comprised of Shawnee, Wea, Kickapoo, and Miami warriors 
were at Kekionga.134 Scott’s men killed two defenders in a long hut but found that the 
inhabitants had abandoned the town. When the villagers fled, they ran in the opposite 
direction of Hardin’s detachment. In response Scott ordered Wilkinson to take forty men 
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to attack the fleeing villagers. When the fighting ended, the volunteers had killed thirty 
people and taken six prisoners. The prisoner count proved disappointing because one of 
the primary objectives of this mission was to capture prisoners. The Kentuckians had 
killed many more Native Americans than they captured.135 
 On June 2, Scott ordered Hardin’s company to attack two Kickapoo towns west of 
Kekionga. As Hardin’s men entered the first town, a small band of Kickapoo warriors 
fled. Hardin sent for reinforcements and continued his pursuit of the small band of 
warriors, killing six Kickapoo warriors after a brief skirmish. When the volunteers 
arrived at the second village, they found old men, women, and children. At the end of the 
day, Hardin and his men had killed six warriors and captured fifty-two prisoners, mostly 
women and children.136 
 On June 2, seeking more prisoners, Scott ordered Wilkinson to attack the Wea 
village of Kethtipeckanunk. Wilkinson departed early in the morning hoping to catch the 
residents off guard, but he found the town deserted. Wilkinson’s men destroyed seventy 
homes, several acres of corn and other property, and returned to Kekionga.137 
 After completing these raids, Scott ordered his physically battered men to begin 
the 155-mile journey home. In less than thirty days, Scott’s raid killed thirty-two Indians 
and captured fifty-eight prisoners. The volunteers marched forty-one of the prisoners to 
Fort Steuben but released sixteen of the feeblest with a message that “the United States 
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desired peace, but they were able to destroy the red man if they truly wanted.”138 Scott 
further warned: “The sons of war will be let loose against you, and the hatchet will never 
be buried until your country is desolated, and your people humbled to the dust.”139 
  Kentucky’s leaders were elated over Scott’s raid. St. Clair and Knox praised 
Scott and his volunteers and Washington garnered much praise from Kentuckians for 
ordering the attack.140 Most important, Scott’s raid sent a strong message to the Ohio 
Indians that their most remote villages were not out of the reach of the Kentucky 
Mounted Volunteers.141 
 St. Clair wanted to keep the Indians on the defensive and thus ordered a second 
raid consisting of five hundred Kentuckians under the command James Wilkinson. The 
Kentuckians departed on August 1 for the French and Wabash village of L’Anguille. The 
Kentuckians started in the direction of the Miami towns, but turned toward the Wabash 
villages to confuse enemy scouts. Wilkinson’s force traveled seventy miles in two and a 
half days before they temporarily lost their way. The column arrived at L’Anguille on 
August 7 and hastily crossed the Eel River. Wilkinson’s force captured thirty-four 
prisoners, mostly women and children, and killed six warriors while losing only two 
militiamen. The Kentuckians then cut down the standing corn and burned the town before 
resting for the night.142 
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Wilkinson intended to attack the nearby Kickapoo villages the next morning, but 
his men were reluctant to advance farther into enemy territory and increase the chance of 
Indian ambush. The Kentuckians convinced Wilkinson to change his plans and he 
traveled toward the abandoned villages at Ouiatenon to destroy more corn. Wilkson’s 
force then returned to Kentucky following Scott’s original path. In the raid’s aftermath, 
Wilkinson wrote an inflated report in which he claimed that his force had destroyed the 
primary Wea village. He also praised the conduct of the men under his command. Like 
Scott’s raid, Wilkinson’s force sent a reminder message to the Ohio Indians that they 
were not out of reach of the United States.143 
Neither Scott nor Wilkinson’s raid decided the outcome of the Northwest Indian 
War, but Americans nonetheless celebrated them as great triumphs following Harmar’s 
disaster. The two raids combined killed approximately fifty Indians and took less than 
one hundred prisoners, while the Kentuckians suffered ten killed and wounded. 144 
Historian Jack Jule Gifford argues these raids convinced individual warriors in the 
Wabash villages to stay home rather than face the American army in the coming years.145 
Likewise, historians John Grenier, Wiley Sword, and Harry Ward argue that these raids 
factored into the decision of some Wea, Kickapoo, and other nations in central Indiana 
and Illinois to seek peace. They feared that the Americans had returned to their old ways 
of destroying villages and killing noncombatants. 146 
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General Arthur St. Clair’s Campaign (Fall 1791) 
In the fall of 1791, Arthur St. Clair led an expedition to subdue the Ohio Indians. St. Clair 
faced a shortage of regular troops and to lessen costs decided to recruit foot militia rather 
than mounted militia.147 As a result, many respected militia leaders such as Charles Scott 
refused to participate in the offensive. Command of the militia fell to William Oldham, 
an uninspiring leader who did not enjoy the fame of other frontiersmen like Daniel 
Boone, George Rogers Clark, and Benjamin Logan.148 Consequently, St. Clair’s army, 
like Harmar’s, consisted of substitute militiamen who were too old or young, or did not 
understand how to fight the Ohio Indians. 
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Not long after St. Clair’s army entered the Ohio Country, they faced supply 
problems. St. Clair’s quartermaster requisitioned too few supplies and those he received 





were of poor quality. St. Clair’s desire to control costs led him to make the same mistakes 
as Harmar as he prepared for the offensive. For example, the army had trouble keeping 
axes sharp and in working order as they cleared roads through the forest. As a result, the 
army was easy to track and the enemy had ample time to plan an attack.149 The soldiers 
responsible for clearing roads complained that the axes provided by the quartermaster 
were of poor quality and bent “like dumplings.”150 St. Clair also had a rocky relationship 
with his subordinate officers. General Richard Butler, who was a twenty-year friend of 
St. Clair’s, criticized his commanding officer for his ignorance of Native Americans.151 
St. Clair’s limited knowledge contributed to the disastrous defeat his army suffered on the 
morning of November 4. 
On October 14, St. Clair stopped the advance at Fort Jefferson to remedy the 
army’s supply situation. However, after ten days the army ran out of forage to supply 
cattle and horses. On October 24, the army began searching for a more desirable location, 
pushing American forces deeper into enemy territory and stretching their supply lines 
further. After a slow eleven-day march during which the men spent much time in camp 
waiting on provisions to arrive, the army arrived at the future site of Fort Recovery along 
the Wabash River. 
Throughout the ten-day march between Forts Jefferson and Recovery the army 
received minimal intelligence reports because St. Clair employed only twenty Chickasaw 
Indian scouts, having a low opinion of Native Americans. As a result, St. Clair’s army 
had little information about Indian movement between the villages in the Ohio Country. 
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St. Clair believed that a large American army with superior numbers could withstand any 
attack the Ohio Indians could muster. But his scouts proved unable to supply intelligence 
about the size of the Indian force gathering against him.152 
St. Clair’s army arrived at of Fort Recovery exhausted and many of his men fell 
ill. Fearing a mutiny among his exhausted men, St. Clair did not order the immediate 
construction of breastworks or other defensive measures. The only defensive measure St. 
Clair took was to order a single scouting party to investigate the nearby forests. The 
scouting party encountered a war party of forty-five Indians, but did not fire on them 
because they feared the Indians’ superior numbers would easily overwhelm them. The 
party reported the incident to St. Clair’s subordinate, Butler, but he did not immediately 
tell his commanding officer because he did not want to disturb St. Clair at night. Butler’s 
delay ensured that the Ohio Indians had the element of surprise.153 
St. Clair’s location chose also helped the Native Americans surprise the weary 
Americans. The men established camp on a plain with many fallen trees nearby and tall 
vegetation growing over the trunks. As a result, Indian warriors had multiple concealed 
locations to fire on St. Clair’s men. They also could maneuver easily around the 
defenseless American perimeter and get in position for a surprise attack.154 
The Native Americans were in place before daybreak, but they withheld their 
attack until the American forces finished morning reveille and many men had left camp 
to retrieve horses and cattle released for the night to forage. The Kentucky militia, 
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encamped separately from the regular army, were attacked first by three hundred 
warriors. The surprise attack forced the Kentuckians to retreat chaotically toward the 
regular army camp. But the militia’s entry into the army camp prevented the regular 
soldiers from forming battle lines to counter the attack. The chaos of the Kentuckian 
retreat drew the attention of the American soldiers far from the main body of Indian 
warriors who penetrated the American lines from the east. The Native Americans well-
planned attack succeeded in surprising the American army, and the lack of defensive 
fortifications allowed the attackers to overrun the American lines quickly. By the end of 
fighting, the Indians had succeeded in killing over one third of the American army. Out 
of the 1,669 American combatants, 593 enlisted men and thirty-seven officers died, and 
252 enlisted men and 32 officers were wounded.155 In addition, an estimated two hundred 
camp followers died in the fighting. In the wake of the battle, the western settlers found 
themselves without an effective standing army and nearly defenseless. 
After his return to Fort Washington, St. Clair blamed the Kentuckians for the 
defeat. Their cowardly behavior, he argued in his report to Knox and Washington, 
prevented regular troops from counterattacking. In response, the Kentuckians argued that 
St. Clair ignored signs of danger and continued to push his army deeper into enemy 
territory without the necessary support or provisions, contributing directly to their 
defeat.156 
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Both St. Clair and the Kentuckians offered accurate critiques. The expedition was 
supplied with poor quality equipment that delayed their progress into the Ohio Country. 
St. Clair’s desire to keep costs low meant the army did not have the necessary equipment 
and as it marched deeper into enemy territory it lacked adequate provisions. However, 
Kentucky militiamen performed poorly in battle. Their disorganized flight prevented 
regular troops from mounting a defense and contributed to the high numbers of American 
casualties. St. Clair’s decision to use a draft to fill his ranks left him with inexperienced 





substitutes instead of experienced woodsmen. In addition, St. Clair confronted elements 
beyond his control, including a weeks-long steady rain. Still, St. Clair’s poor planning 
placed the army in a position that made it easy for Native American warriors to attack 
and penetrate American lines. 
General Anthony Wayne’s Campaign (1792-1794) 
The Kentuckians got a chance to redeem themselves under the command of Anthony 
Wayne, who organized a new offensive in 1792.157 Wayne did not want to depend on the 
militia during the campaign and Kentuckians did not welcome serving under a federal 
officer again. Twice, federal officers had conducted poorly planned campaigns and 
suffered heavy losses.158 Wayne’s experience with ineffective militia in the American 
Revolution prompted his distrust and desire to avoid the use of militia forces in the 
forthcoming offensive. In addition, he had to rebuild the U.S. Army, devastated after St. 
Clair’s campaign.159 Nonetheless, over the next two years Wayne and Kentuckians 
developed a mutual respect that helped secure victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.160 
Wayne recognized the difference in quality between the foot militia drafted by St. 
Clair and Harmar and the mounted Kentuckians who served under Scott and Wilkinson, 
and he specifically asked for the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers to assist the U.S. Army’s 
advance into the Ohio Country. In a flattering letter to Charles Scott that later appeared in 
The Kentucky Gazette, St. Clair wrote:  
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From the Secretary of War . . . with positive orders from the President of 
the United States, to make those audacious Savages feel our superiority of 
arms, and to prevent the murder of helpless women and children. He is 
confident that I shall be well and powerfully supported in this arduous 
task, by the brave and virtuous mounted Volunteers of Kentucky.161 
 
In 1793, Wayne received 1,500 mounted Kentuckians on six-month enlistments. 
Recognizing that the legion was not ready for battle, Wayne used Kentuckians as supply 
packhorses to relieve the supply shortages suffered by soldiers stationed in advanced 
forts. Kentuckians did not like serving as packhorses for the army, but Wayne’s decision 
ensured the army was well supplied in 1792 and early 1793 as they advanced along the 
Wabash and Maumee Rivers. Wayne’s decision averted the supply shortages that plagued 
St. Clair, and enabled the United States army to maintain a constant presence in enemy 
territory.162 Wayne also ensured the Kentuckians’ service by calling them to the field as 
mounted volunteers. Keeping their terms of service to six months or less also ensured the 
Kentuckians’ loyalty. As a result, Kentuckians did not participate in key battles, but they 
were instrumental in keeping the army well supplied and prepared for battle. The 
Kentuckians who served as packhorses also avoided ambushes because they understood 
the skulking way of war. Finally, Wayne trained the regular army in the skulking tactics 
of the Kentuckians, ensuring their victory against the Native Americans. 
Aware that his regular troops were not ready to face the Ohio Indians, Wayne 
used Kentucky frontiersmen’s tactics to train his new recruits for wilderness combat. He 
also employed Kentuckians familiar with fighting Native Americans as scouts during the 
offensive. Wayne organized mock battles to prepare his army for an enemy expert in the 
use of skulking tactics. In these training exercises, Wayne divided his army into two 
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groups. One group posed as Indian warriors while the other side defended against their 
attack. These mock battles prepared soldiers by teaching them to detect signs of an 
ambush, how to react when ambushed, and how to form lines to hold off an Indian 
attacks while the cavalry organized a counterattack.163 Visitors who witnessed the 
training and mock battles commented on the “silence, industry, and discipline” of the 
soldiers.164 
As a result of this training, during the Battle of Fallen Timbers on August 20, 
1794 regular soldiers performed well and delivered a decisive victory for the United 
States. A scouting party, consisting primarily of Kentuckians, discovered where Native 
Americans planned to ambush the American army. With this knowledge, Wayne 
formulated a plan and attacked the enemy on his terms. Wayne waited for two days 
before assaulting the enemy position because his scouts advised him that the warriors 
prepared for battle by fasting and waiting weakened them.165 When the Americans 
attacked, Wayne used a combined assault of dragoons and riflemen to attack the Indian 
defensive line. The dragoons succeeding in breaking through the defensive line forcing 
the warriors to begin a retreat. Wayne sent in three hundred mounted Kentuckians to 
reinforce the dragoons in their pursuit of the retreating Indians toward the British Fort 
Miami. The decision by the British to keep the doors of the fort closed and not engage the 
American forces ensured that the Native Americans had no choice but to surrender to the 
Americans. Wayne’s legion demonstrated a proficiency in wilderness warfare enabling 
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them to secure victory. While Wayne did not use the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers in 
battle, he understood the advantages of their tactics when facing Indians in the Ohio 
Country.166 
 The Northwest Indian Wars demonstrated that Kentucky militiamen, both officers 
and enlisted men, would not answer the call for militia service if they could not 
participate on their terms. The two raids in 1791 demonstrated that the Kentucky 
Mounted Volunteers could strike distant towns and villages quickly, but they avoided 
major engagements with Indian warriors. Apart from Wayne, regular army officers did 
not understand the Kentuckians’ tactics and desire to fight mounted. This lack of 
understanding prompted Harmar and St. Clair to draft foot militia, and they were shocked 
that inferior and inexperienced men answered their calls for service.167 In both instances 
the results were catastrophic.168 Wayne recognized these problems and personally 
requested that Scott lead the militia into the Ohio Country to aid the regular army. Wayne 
used the militia to maintain the regular army in the field enabling his force to maintain a 
regular presence in the Ohio country. He also understood the Kentuckians’ skulking 
tactics and trained his regular force in them to prepare his men for battle in the 
wilderness. 
The Battle of Fallen Timbers led to the Treaty of Greenville, signed between the 
United States and the Ohio Indians in 1795. Native Americans renounced their claims to 
Kentucky and stopped raids on settlements in the state.169 Kentuckians now lived in 
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relative peace, but whites continued to push into the Ohio Country and occupy Indian 
territory. American aggression led to new tensions and the rise of the Shawnee war chief 
Tecumseh who built a large Indian Confederation supported with arms from the British to 










































KENTUCKIANS IN THE WAR OF 1812 
 
Following the signing of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville, Kentuckians lived in 
relative peace for nearly two decades. But fighting resumed when war broke out between 
the United States and Great Britain in the War of 1812. Kentuckians volunteered in large 
numbers to fight as members of the regular army and militia against the British and their 
Indian allies. During the conflict, Kentucky had the highest number of volunteers per 
capita of any state. Kentucky’s militia, both foot and mounted, primarily fought the 
confederation of Northwestern Indians led by Tecumseh that inhabited the modern states 
of Indiana and Illinois. Kentuckians participated in two offensives against Tecumseh and 
his British allies. The first ended in defeat at River Raisin in the winter of 1813. Their 
second, in the summer of 1813, ended in a decisive victory that resulted in Tecumseh’s 
death and ended fighting in the Northwest. After the defeat of British and Indian forces in 
Upper Canada, a small force of Kentuckians went to New Orleans to assist General 
Andrew Jackson’s defense of the city against British invasion. Jackson enjoyed a great 
victory, but controversy surrounded the Kentuckians’ because they lacked arms and 
performed poorly in battle. Jackson accused the Kentuckians of cowardice because when 
the British attacked their position on the western side of the Mississippi River they 
retreated chaotically and ceded a large amount of territory before they formed a new 





defended the militia. They quoted a court of inquiry that exonerated the militia, arguing 
that Kentucky’s troops had been placed in an indefensible position and had insufficient 
arms.170 
In the nearly two decades between 1795 and the War of 1812, the Kentucky 
militia suffered from poor organization, training, discipline, and equipment. Following 
Anthony Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers, the militia deteriorated because Kentuckians 
no longer believed the Ohio Indians posed a threat to the state. Militia members failed to 
maintain their arms or hold training drills.171 Lacking an imminent Indian or foreign 
threat the militia became a paper army. Most militia companies failed to muster and 
maintain their weapons, while companies that mustered lacked effective training.172 
Still, some Kentuckians organized volunteer militia companies in the years 
between 1795 and 1812. Volunteer militia companies developed slowly and became more 
common than enrolled companies after the War of 1812. Volunteer and enrolled 
companies shared many similarities, but a law that required all men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five to join an enrolled company, set the two types of militias apart. 
Enrolled companies bore the brunt of training and organizing in the 1780s and early 
1790s when Kentuckians routinely attacked the Ohio Indians. Volunteer companies did 
not reach the pinnacle of their influence until the 1840s, but a 1799 state law exempting 
men in volunteer companies from their required training in enrolled companies reveals 
                                                 
170 Andrew Jackson to James Monroe, 9 January 1815, John Adair to Andrew Jackson, 20 March 1815, 
Andrew Jackson to John Adair, 2 April 1815, John Spencer Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 6 
vols. (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), 2: 92-95, 136-38, 200-01; Skeen, 
Citizen Soldiers, 170-71. 
171 Laver, Citizens, 14. 





the growing importance of volunteer companies.173 Nonetheless, in 1812 volunteer 
company numbers were not numerous enough to offset the decline of enrolled 
companies. 
The officers and enlisted men belonging to militia companies in the War of 1812 
had increased their economic standing compared to their predecessors in the 1790s. 
Officers enlarged their slave ownership significantly. Fifty percent owned slaves, with an 
average of twelve per household, nearly double that of the officers in the 1790s. Some 10 
percent of militia officers held political office after the conflict, a slight decline from the 
1790s cohort. The highest office obtained by a Kentucky veteran of the War of 1812 was 
the vice presidency, to which Richard Mentor Johnson was elected in 1828. The majority 
of the office-holding veterans held seats in the state House of Representatives.174 
The economic status of enlisted men followed that of the officers. They likewise 
raised their economic status over the militiamen of the 1790s. Slave ownership among 
enlisted veterans more than doubled, with 23 percent owning slaves, an average of six per 
household. Land and horse ownership also increased significantly with close to 35 
percent of War of 1812 militia veterans owning land and over 55 percent owning horses. 
The increase in horse ownership became clear in the summer of 1813 when 3,500 
mounted Kentuckians joined William Henry Harrison’s army in the invasion of Upper 
Canada.175 
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Militiamen who fought in the War of 1812 hoped to achieve recognition for their 
accomplishments in battle. The men who joined the militia in 1812 had listened for years 
to stories of those who served in the 1790s. Public speakers regularly celebrated the 
accomplishments of the militia and held roll calls for those who had died in battle. These 
public rituals convinced men that they could achieve fame through service in the militia 
and advance themselves economically, socially, and politically. 
When the United States entered the war, the deficiencies of the Kentucky militia 
were obvious to commanding officers. Indeed, U.S. army officers struggled with the 
poorly supplied militia who arrived at camp. Commanders complained of militiamen 
missing muskets, powder, shot, food, and other necessities. Kentucky’s enrolled militia 
companies readily answered the call to fight the British, but their lack of training 
repeatedly hampered the American war effort and quartermasters scrambled to obtain 
necessary provisions.176 
The war left Americans in the Trans-Appalachian West vulnerable. The British 
quickly went on the offensive, capturing Detroit on August 16, 1812. From Detroit the 
British could easily arm Indian nations to attack Americans, posing an immediate threat 
to Americans in the West. Westerners believed it imperative that the United States 
remove the British from Detroit to neutralize the threat to their homes. Robert McAfee, a 
Kentuckian who published the first history of the War of 1812 in the Northwest described 
the feelings of Kentuckians following the capture of Detroit: “It created an excitement 
and indignation as great as the catastrophe was unexpected.”177 A reporter for the 
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National Intelligencer believed that the American defeat would result in “Savages, whose 
roving, active & restless disposition, instigated by the British officers, would soon 
transport them to our neighborhood and excite them to a barbarous warfare upon the 
defenceless frontier.”178 Kentuckians in enrolled militia companies eagerly answered the 
call to war, but the American response was delayed because quartermasters frantically 
sought supplies for them. 
President James Madison appointed James Winchester of Tennessee commander 
of the Northwest Army and ordered him to organize an offensive to recapture Detroit and 
invade Upper Canada. Scott, now Kentucky’s governor, distrusted Winchester, 
considered him arrogant, believed that he could not gain the respect of Kentuckians on 
the battlefield, and thought his knowledge of the Northwest limited.179 In response, Scott 
awarded the governor of the Indiana territory, William Henry Harrison, the rank of major 
general in Kentucky’s militia. He tasked him with building a militia army that would 
invade Upper Canada.180 In appointing Harrison, Scott hoped to undercut Winchester’s 
federal commission and ensure that Kentuckians served under Harrison. Kentucky 
leaders were suspicious of Winchester. Richard Mentor Johnson, a commander of a 
mounted corps of Kentucky volunteers, wrote that Winchester’s command create “a great 
deal of uneasiness in the Army.” He added that men have “great Confidence in Harrison 
but with Winchester they have very little.”181 
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Kentuckians’ distrust of Winchester originated in their respect for Harrison. 
Harrison had served as an officer in Wayne’s Legion and remained in the Northwest 
following the victory at Fallen Timbers. The year before the declaration of war, Harrison 
had led an army that included one hundred Kentucky volunteers that defeated Native 
American warriors at Tecumseh’s confederacy headquarters, Prophetstown. His exploits 
against Native Americans convinced Kentuckians that he was the ideal candidate to fight 
Tecumseh’s Confederacy. 
After Scott appointed Harrison, the American force had two commanding officers 
both building their own armies. To end this confusion, Kentuckian Henry Clay wrote 
feverishly to leaders in Washington in support of Harrison’s appointment as commander. 
He wrote to Secretary of State James Monroe “that throughout all parts of the W. Country 
there has been the strongest demonstrations of confidence in him given.”182 To the relief 
of Kentuckians, on September 25, Secretary of War William Eustis named Harrison the 
supreme commander of the Northwestern Army. 
Harrison’s force marched north on October 7 to Fort Wayne to organize an 
offensive. He divided the army into three brigades, with plans for them to unite at Fort 
Meigs on the Miami River. Harrison hoped that each brigade would destroy Native 
American villages and resistance as they progressed to Detroit. The plan proved too 
complex and the brigades bogged down in the cold and swampy regions of Ohio and 
Michigan, failing to reassemble at the Miami River rapids.183 The winter campaign was 
turning into an abysmal failure. Harrison ordered Winchester to depart Fort Defiance in 
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late December and meet him at the rapids of the Miami River. Together, the two armies 
would advance on Fort Malden.184 
 As Winchester advanced, he learned that a British and Indian army threatened 
settlements near River Raisin, but hesitated to detour from his rendezvous with Harrison. 
When his Kentucky officers questioned his masculinity, Winchester decided to advance 
to the River Raisin on January 16. Harrison advised against the attack, but Winchester 
found himself in a difficult position. His malnourished troops needed supplies and he 
thought he could retain the loyalty of his Kentucky troops only by going on the 
offensive.185 The army entered Frenchtown on January 18 and briefly engaged British 
forces before forcing them to retreat.186 
 On the morning of January 22, Colonel Henry Proctor, commander of a 1,200 
British-Indian force, launched a surprise attack on Winchester’s army. Kentucky riflemen 
inflicted heavy casualties on the British regulars, but warriors overwhelmed the American 
right flank, prompting the militiamen to panic and flee. Seeing his line collapse, 
Winchester decided to surrender his the entire army to avert a slaughter. Following the 
surrender, Proctor marched the able-bodied prisoners to Amherstburg. He left the 
wounded in nearby cabins under British guard, but a group of Wyandot warriors killed 
about sixty of the wounded men the following morning.187 In Kentucky, the incident 
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caused outrage with cries of “Remember the Raisin” raised at community gatherings. The 
massacre encouraged Kentuckians to pursue another invasion in the summer of 1813.188  
The defeat at River Raisin sparked panic throughout the Northwest. Citizens 
worried about possible Indian raids. Harrison’s defeat frustrated the Madison 
administration, but the lobbying of Clay and other Kentucky leaders convinced the 
president to leave him in command.189 Harrison had overextended his forces and supply 
lines when he divided his army. He demanded too much of his army and the weather 
conditions of the late fall and early winter slowed the progress of the American forces. 
But Harrison learned from his mistakes and modified his plans for the invasion of Upper 
Canada. First, he waited for the United States to gain control of Lake Erie. American 
control of the lake ensured that British forces were cut off from supplies and 
reinforcements. While waiting for American naval victory, Harrison stocked supplies and 
mounted militia raids of Indian villages. He called up the mounted volunteers when was 
ready to take the offensive in 1813.190 
Summer 1813 
The defeat and massacre at River Raisin caused Kentucky volunteer rates to drop in early 
1813. Only Johnson’s cavalry regiment, organized in February 1813, defied this trend.191 
In a March 28 letter to Secretary of War John Armstrong, Harrison asked for mounted 
volunteers from Kentucky: 
Experience has convinced me, that militia are more efficient in the early 
than in the latter part of their service. . . . Let the moment for the 
commencement of the march from the Rapids be fixed, and the Militia 
might be taken to that point proceed and accomplish the object and return 
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home in two months. . . . I have no doubt however but a sufficient number 
of good men can be procured and should they be allowed to serve on 
Horse Back Kentucky would furnish some regiments that would be not 
inferior to those that fought at the River Raisin and they were in my 
opinion superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times.192 
  
Harrison used Johnson’s regiment to raid nearby Native American towns. He also used 
them to relieve the besieged Fort Meigs and to clear a path for his army to advance north. 
The mounted Kentuckians were defeated when they attempted to rescue Fort Meigs, but 
the losses the British suffered made British leaders rethink their siege. They pulled their 
forces back to Michigan.  
Meanwhile, Harrison spent the summer gathering supplies and finalizing his 
plans. He requested Isaac Shelby to call up the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers and 
despite Shelby’s advanced age of sixty-two, asked that he personally lead the 
Kentuckians north. Harrison wrote: 
I have this moment received a letter from the Secretary of war in which he 
authorizes me to call from the neighboring states such numbers of militia 
as I may deem requisite for the ensuring operation against upper canada. . . 
. To make this last effort why not, my dear sir, come in person, you would 
not object to a command that would be nominal only–I have such 
confidence in your wisdom that you in fact should be “be the guiding 
Head and I the hand.”193 
 
Harrison’s request reveals that he understood Kentuckians’ desire to have a leader they 
trusted. Shelby sent out a call for a “general rendezvous of the Kentucky Volunteers” on 
July 31, and added, “I will meet you there in person.” He warned of a draft if 2,000 
volunteers did not assemble.194 The response exceeded expectations and 3,500 
Kentuckians arrived in Newport to participate in the offensive. 
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The Kentuckians rendezvoused with Harrison at the Maumee Rapids just prior to 
Commodore Olive Hazard Perry’s defeat of the British navy on Lake Erie. Perry’s 
victory cut Proctor’s supply lines and enabled Harrison’s force to advance.195 Mounted 
Kentuckians landed in Upper Canada on October 3 and pursued Proctor’s retreating army 
from Amherstburg before regular army troops crossed the river. Although reluctant to 
proceed, Harrison ordered Johnson’s mounted regiment to advance and harass Proctor’s 
vanguard, comprised primarily of Native Americans led by Tecumseh. Tecumseh 
attempted a defensive stand at McGregor’s Creek, but constant harassment from Johnson 
prevented it. 
While Johnson’s regiment harassed and skirmished with Proctor’s rearguard, the 
rest of Harrison’s army began its pursuit of the British. Proctor’s army, suffering from 
fatigue, desertion, and poor morale, made final preparations for their final stand near 
Moraviantown. After Harrison’s force united with Johnson’s regiment, he prepared for an 
assault on Proctor and Tecumseh’s position. Johnson’s regiment divided into two 
battalions of five hundred men each. He placed his younger brother, James Johnson, in 
command of a battalion with orders to attack Proctor’s left. The foot militia led by 
Harrison and Shelby attacked the center and right flank defended by British regulars. 
On October 5, the Kentuckians began their assault on the Anglo-Indian defensive 
line. Prior to the assault, an American scout discovered a ford in a swamp that allowed 
the mounted Kentuckians to penetrate the enemy’s defensive line at a gap between the 
British and Indians. Johnson redeployed his men quickly. He led his battalion across the 
ford and attacked from the rear while his brother’s battalion attacked the Indians from the 
                                                 





front. Johnson’s regiment quickly penetrated British and Native American lines, 
dismounted, and fired on the enemy from the rear. Attacked from multiple directions, 
many Indian and British soldiers panicked and abandoned their positions. 196 In the chaos 
of the battle, a Kentuckian shot Tecumseh. Johnson’s contemporaries credited him with 
killing Tecumseh, but historians question the assertion. Still, they agree that a Kentuckian 
likely killed Tecumseh because they focused the attack in the area where Tecumseh died 
in battle.197 
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The Kentuckians suffered sixteen deaths in the battle, while a comparable number 
were injured. The Indians had an equivalent number of dead, but six of those killed in 
action were chiefs, including Tecumseh. While the losses to the Native Americans were 
not significant in number, those killed were vitally important leaders. None of the chiefs 
who remained alive possessed Tecumseh’s influence nor could they maintain the Pan-
Indian confederation.198 
Following their victory at the Battle of the Thames, Harrison and the Kentuckians 
withdrew to Detroit to muster out the militia a mere ninety days after their assembly at 
Newport. The Kentucky militia returned to their homes to tend their crops, leaving a 
small force of regulars to defend the entire Northwest. After the Kentuckians left, 
Harrison reported to Armstrong: 
The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other 
people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to 
carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded, too, 
that the enemy would be unprepared for the shock, and they could not 
resist it.199 
 
 Kentuckians believed that the American victory in the Northwest was not possible 
without a commander like Harrison. He recognized his mistakes in previous operations, 
modified his plans, and pushed to use mounted Kentuckians in future expeditions. 
Harrison used tactics employed by proven leaders such as Wayne and Scott to invade 
Upper Canada. Moreover, he coordinated his offensive against a British army that lacked 
support after U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry gained control of Lake Erie.200 
Winter 1814-1815 
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Kentuckians’ joy soon faded after 2,300 Kentuckians marched south to assist in the 
defense of New Orleans. In New Orleans the Kentuckians were poorly clothed and 
suffered from exposure. More important, less than one third of the Kentuckians were 
armed and smaller number of men lacked proper weapons. The poor condition of the 
Kentuckians prompted General Andrew Jackson to wonder whether he could make use of 
them, but he did what he could and armed four hundred Kentuckians with weapons taken 
from Louisiana militiamen.201 
 To defend New Orleans, Jackson placed men on both sides of the Mississippi 
River. The defenders on the west bank, under the command of Major General David 
Morgan, had orders to use artillery to protect Jackson’s flank. Jackson ordered four 
hundred Kentuckians to the west bank to assist Morgan in its defense. However, only 260 
Kentuckians crossed the river. The rest returned to camp because they were unarmed. 
When the British mounted an assault on the Kentucky militia, which held a position in 
advance of the main American defenses, the Kentuckians fired two rounds and fled. 
Morgan, described the Kentuckians’ dismal performance: “It was a complete flight in 
place of a retreat, they were in the utmost disorder, one running after another, or in other 
words every man for himself.”202 
 The Kentuckians regrouped behind the American lines tasked with defending the 
American right flank. Soon after taking their new position, the British attacked and 
flanked the Kentuckians, causing then to take flight again. A ripple effect soon followed 
and officers were unable to halt the withdrawal which soon turned into a general rout. 
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The artillery at the back of the American line could not fire on the British forces because 
they feared hitting the disorganized militia. He ordered the destruction of the cannon and 
dumped them into the river. He eventually reorganized some of the militia and they 
formed a new line a half mile up the river, but he had too few troops to hold the new 
line.203 
 The conduct of the Kentuckians in the defense of the west bank left a smear on 
their war record. It also sparked years of heated debates between Jackson and Kentucky 
leaders. Jackson wrote in the immediate aftermath of the battle that 
no words can express the mortification I felt at witnessing the scene 
Exhibited on the opposite bank. . . . The want of Discipline, the want of 
Order, a total disregard to Obedience, and a Spirit of insubordination, not 
less destructive than Cowardise itself, this appears to be the cause which 
led to the disaster.204 
 
In Jackson’s report to Madison he directly blamed the Kentuckians for the disintegration 
of American forces on the west bank. “The Kentucky reinforcements, ingloriously fled,” 
Jackson wrote, “drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and 
thus yielding to the enemy that most fortunate position.”205 
 A court of inquiry largely exonerated the Kentucky militia, noting that the men 
lacked arms and were placed poorly to defend the line. General John Adair, commander 
of the Kentuckians on the west bank, tried to make Jackson to retract his harsh criticism 
of the militia. When Jackson refused, he and the Kentucky press exchanged heated 
responses that lasted years through his presidential campaigns of 1824, 1828, and 
1832.206 
                                                 
203 Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, 170-171. 
204 Basset, Jackson Correspondence, 1: 135-36; Skeen, Citizens Soldier, 171. 
205 Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, 2: 136-138. 





 The controversy surrounding the Kentuckians’ performances in the Battle of New 
Orleans followed the pattern of the militia’s previous performances in battle. The 
Kentucky Mounted Volunteers proved capable fighters when they had the element of 
surprise. They moved quickly and were able to flank enemies as they demonstrated in 
Scott’s campaign and the invasion of Upper Canada. However, when the Kentuckians 
had to hold a defensive line in any major battle they lacked the discipline to stand their 
ground and often broke, with disastrous consequences. 
The American victory over the British and their Indian allies at Moraviantown 
crushed the remaining Indian resistance to American expansion in the Northwest. 
Tecumseh’s death destroyed the Indian Confederation and forced Britain to remove their 
troops from forts on American territory. While the Treaty of Ghent had little effect on 
people in the eastern seaboard, the American conquest in the West opened the region to 
white expansion at the expense of Native Americans. The War of 1812 produced no clear 
victor between the United States and Britain, but Britain’s Indian allies exited the conflict 
as distinct losers. Within twenty years of the conflict’s end, Americans possessed all the 
Native land east of the Mississippi River, pushing Native Americans west and south on to 
small reservations. 
The performance of the Kentucky Militia in the War of 1812 mirrored their mixed 
results in the Northwest Indian Wars of the 1790s. Kentuckians’ desire to advance 
forward in the winter of 1813 enabled the enemy to ambush and defeat them. The murder 
of Kentucky prisoners following their defeat at River Raisin gave Kentuckians a battle 
cry and many answered the call for militia service. During the summer campaign of 1813, 





Upper Canada. The ability of Johnson’s men to maneuver quickly and keep the retreating 
British and Indian forces off balance helped American forces during their invasion of 
Upper Canada in the summer of 1813. 
The controversy surrounding the performance of the Kentucky militia during the 
Battle of New Orleans helped to mobilize Kentucky’s newspapers and leaders to 
publicize the wartime accomplishments of Kentuckians. Their defense of the Kentucky 
militia at New Orleans convinced state residents of the accomplishments of the militia in 
combat. Kentucky writers emphasized the state’s contributions to the development of the 
United States. Over the next two decades, Kentuckians forgot their numerous military 
defeats and instead forged communal memories that focused on their victories and the 





























COMMUNITY CELEBRATIONS AND TOAST-MAKING REMEMBER THE 
KENTUCKY MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS 
 
Kentuckians’ victory over Tecumseh and the British in the War of 1812 ensured the 
security of Kentucky for whites, and the function of the state militia changed to slave 
patrols, prevention of civil unrest, and participated in parades at community celebrations. 
The Kentucky militia encouraged the creation of a national, state, and western identity 
and helped forge a collective memory that celebrated the accomplishments of the militia. 
In the process, the militia reinforced the state’s social and racial hierarchy that placed 
white men at the pinnacle. In the early nineteenth century, when Kentuckians gathered to 
celebrate holidays and anniversaries such as Independence Day, Washington’s Birthday, 
and the Battle of Fallen Timbers, speakers enthralled listeners with stories about the 
battle exploits of Kentucky’s sons under the command of leaders such as President 
George Washington. Toasters connected famous Kentuckians such as General Charles 
Scott to Washington to bring attention to the contributions of Kentuckians in the creation 
of the United States. Orators rarely mentioned Kentuckians’ defeats, except during 
routine roll calls when speakers heaped praise on the men who sacrificed their lives for 
the betterment of Kentucky and the United States. When remembering deceased men, 
speakers praised their virtue and self-sacrifice rather than focus on their actions in battle 





believed that the Kentucky militia were the preferred and most capable Indian fighters of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.207 
Toast making was a standard practice at nearly every public celebration in the 
early nineteenth century United States. The rituals at these gatherings created and 
reinforced communal values and attitudes, and promoted nationalism and a collective 
history. Newspapers like the Kentucky Gazette described the festivities throughout the 
state, and these reports offer insight into the images and ideas Kentuckians used to 
construct a national identity and collective memory. The gatherings celebrated the civic 
virtue and self-sacrifice of early national and state heroes and enveloped them in an aura 
of myth.208 
Journalists laid the foundation for a narrative that described Kentuckians as the 
best Indian fighters. Contemporary newspapers described the scene as Kentuckians 
crossed the Ohio River to begin Scott’s raid on May 24, 1791. A report described the 
force as consisting of “first class citizens, a member of Congress, members of the 
[Virginia] Senate and Assembly, marshals, Colonels, Mayors, Captains, Lawyers, and 
others serving as privates in the field.”209 Early Newspaper reports provided inspiration 
for the toasters of later decades who recited stories about the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers. 
The earliest recorded militia parades and toasts that honored national holidays, 
prominent figures, or military anniversaries appear in Lexington in 1788. They continued 
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throughout the state for the next sixty years.210 The public gatherings encouraged 
Kentuckians to develop a national, regional, and state identity that emphasized a shared 
embrace of republicanism and the Constitution, and the self-sacrifice, civic virtue, 
bravery, valor, and honor of the soldiers who fought in the Ohio Valley. These 
celebrations also enshrined the economic and social hierarchy controlled by white men. 
Speakers extolled listeners, particularly white men, to emulate the admirable qualities of 
the first generation of Kentuckians and provided examples for how they should conduct 
their lives. Speakers reminded Kentuckians of national heroes like Washington and 
Benjamin Franklin, praising their civic service. Over time, they included more members 
of the founding generation. For example, speakers recast Madison’s image over time. 
Toasters remembered him as a man “firm in Republican virtue” in 1812, but by 1838 
speakers described him as the “artificer of the Constitution.”211 
Toasters praised early Kentuckians and described them as ideal citizens. They told 
listeners how Kentucky’s heroes contributed to the growth and security of the United 
States by fighting the nation’s Indian foes. As late at 1841, a toaster reminded listeners of 
“the heroes of the West–The monuments of their fame are to be found in every battle 
field on which their heroism has been displayed. Posterity will admire, and, when 
necessary, emulate their gallantry.”212 By this time, three generations of Kentuckians had 
listened to speakers praise the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers, encouraging a collective 
memory and common identity that placed white men at the top of the social hierarchy. 
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Over time, speakers began to add new figures whose actions on the battlefield or 
in leadership positions represented republican virtue. The celebrations of 1798 and 1816 
reveal how these celebrations evolved to incorporate a new generation of heroes. In July 
1798, three volunteer militia companies held a joint Independence Day celebration in 
Lexington. Following the tradition of offering toasts after the meal, Lexington’s most 
powerful and respected men praised the United States, the Constitution, Benjamin 
Franklin, Washington, and the militia, calling them “the bulwark of the country in the 
hour of danger.”213 
In 1816, the people of Lexington assembled to celebrate Independence Day in 
near identical fashion. In the morning, citizens watched a militia parade, enjoyed an early 
afternoon meal, and listened to speakers describe the heroes of the American Revolution 
and the War of 1812. Toast makers echoed the past when they saluted Washington, 
Franklin, the United States, the Constitution, and the militia, but they also remembered 
James Madison for his leadership as president during the recent war. The only mention of 
women came at the end of the toasts as they briefly mentioned the women of Kentucky 
who contributed to the state’s development by in teaching young men about American 
values.214 Besides this brief mention of women, white men were at the center of each of 
these events that celebrated and cemented the influential white men of the community, 
state, and nation. 
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Governor Isaac Shelby, Vice President Richard Mentor Johnson, and Governor 
Charles Scott were among the heroes orators celebrated at holiday gatherings. Shelby 
first achieved fame during the American Revolution as a hero at the Battle of King’s 
Mountain, but speakers also focused on his tenure as the first governor of Kentucky. By 
1816, following his leadership in the War of 1812, speakers revisited his tenure in the 
Revolutionary War when they reminisced that “The heroes of our second struggle for 
independence” believed “Gov. [Isaac] Shelby . . . immortalized by his valor in two 
desperate struggles against tyranny.”215 Shelby came out of retirement at the age of sixty-
three and led 3,500 Kentuckians on the offensive that defeated the British and Tecumseh. 
After this victory, toasters revisited Shelby’s Revolutionary War accomplishments and 
described him as “a genuine Kentuckian in principle and practice; immortalized by his 
valor in two desperate struggles against tyranny.” He “merits,” they concluded, “the 
confidence of his countrymen.”216 
 Scott received praise for his military service among speakers who emphasized the 
importance of Kentuckians to the nation and their contributions to the security of the 
United States. Scott fought in the American Revolution alongside Washington, serving at 
Valley Forge, Trenton, Monmouth, and Charleston. He achieved a heroic status when he 
arrived in Kentucky following the Revolution. He commanded Kentucky’s militia forces 
during the Northwest Indian Wars of the 1790s and participated in the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers, bringing an end to Native American raids into Kentucky. Speakers initially 
celebrated Scott as “a soldier of ’76, a terror to our enemies, and a friend to his 
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country.”217 After his death, he was remembered as a man whose “valor, patriotism and 
integrity are indelibly impressed on the hearts of his countrymen.218 Scott rivaled 
Washington in popularity in Kentucky and orators described him as an ideal specimen of 
chivalry and virtue that others should emulate. 
Johnson, became a household name in Kentucky after he was credited with killing 
Tecumseh at the Battle of Thames in 1813. Johnson’s fame after the battle enabled him to 
become vice president under President Martin Van Buren. Kentuckians still discussed 
Johnson’s military record when he finished his term in 1841. But even a term as vice 
president did not supersede his military reputation in the state. Upon his return to 
Kentucky, a speaker told an audience: “The nation has appreciated his merits as a 
statesman and soldier, let us not forget him.”219 
 At these public celebrations Kentuckians who died in battle rivaled the popularity 
and mythological status of the nation’s founders. Toasters routinely honored the men who 
had fallen in the Revolutionary War, the Battle of Fallen Timbers, and at River Raisin. At 
anniversary gatherings, speakers eulogized the local heroes of earlier wars, emphasized 
the sacrifice of Kentuckians lost in battle, celebrated victories in decisive battles, and 
recited a roll call of the dead. In 1798, a speaker in Woodford County reminded the 
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people of the “Patriots of ‘76” who had “died for the liberties of their country,” and 
praised them as “monuments of American valor and patriotism.”220  
No men killed in battle received more recognition than those who died at the 
Battle of River Raisin in the winter of 1813. Over three hundred Kentuckians died in the 
battle, an unusually high figure in this era, but speakers also focused on the killing of 
thirty prisoners the following morning by Native Americans allied to the British. Their 
deaths galvanized Kentuckians when they gathered for Fourth of July celebrations. In 
1813, a speaker memorialized the dead, calling them the “brave, but unfortunate 
Kentuckians, massacred at River Raisin–Their lamentable fate is a proof to the world, 
that British honour is as treacherous as savage barbarism is shocking to humanity!”221 
The battle cry “Remember the Raisin” raised at such eulogies convinced Kentuckians to 
answer the call of duty and participate in the American offensive in the fall of 1813. 
Public speakers presented the British guards as dishonorable men because they did not 
protect the wounded Kentuckians who surrendered. Speeches such as these encouraged 
men to participate in the war effort, and 3,500 volunteers joined Shelby in the invasion of 
Upper Canada. Kentuckians were defeated at River Raisin, but the battle cry “Remember 
the Raisin” echoed at militia gatherings for years after the conclusion of the War of 
1812.222 
While this battle cry and toasters encouraged Kentuckians to think of the savagery 
of their enemy, Kentuckians failed to mention their repeated attacks on Native American 
towns and villages whose primary inhabitants were old men, women, and children. 
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Scott’s raid in 1791 was hailed a successful raid because of the destruction of several 
towns, their crops, and the capture of dozens of prisoners. The American Indian women 
and children proved easy targets for Kentucky raiders who routinely killed and captured 
them to use as bargaining chips to pressure warriors for peace or surrender. The silence in 
regards to these raids by Kentuckians is telling because much of the propaganda 
generated during the War of 1812 actually presented Indian warriors and their allies as 
savages that preyed on innocent and helpless victims.  
 Public speakers also praised military heroes from other states and territories, 
particularly William Henry Harrison. Harrison served in the U.S. army during Wayne’s 
campaign against the Ohio Indians. After the conflict, he served one term in Congress, 
representing the people of the Northwest Territory before he became the governor of 
Indiana Territory. His victory over Native American forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 
1811 garnered him national attention, but made him beloved among Kentuckians who 
witnessed his defeat of his Indian foes. The people of Kentucky appreciated his fighting 
abilities, which prevented Indian attacks on Kentucky. When the War of 1812 began, 
prominent Kentuckians such as Henry Clay asked Secretary of State James Monroe to 
appoint Harrison commander of the Army of the Northwest.223 Clay also wrote to 
Secretary of War William Eustis, noting that he hoped the president would “see fit to 
approve substantially what was done . . . with the respect to the appointment of Govr. 
Harrison.”224 Once Harrison was made the commander of the Northwest Army, he asked 
Governor Shelby to lead the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers on the offensive that killed 
Tecumseh and conquered Upper Canada. In the years following the War of 1812, 
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Harrison was regularly toasted at public gatherings and became known as “the military 
favorite of his western brethren.”225 
Kentuckians’ public celebrations helped create an emerging state and regional 
identity. At a 1788 Fourth of July celebration, a toaster declared “May the Atlantic States 
be just, the Western States be Free and both be happy,” revealing an emerging western 
identity. Over the next twenty years, Kentuckians sought to demonstrate their patriotism 
and importance to the United States while retaining a unique western identity. In 1804, a 
Scott County speaker stated, “The three western states, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio . . 
. are unanimous in their patriotism, harmonious in their endeavors to accelerate the 
growing importance of the western states.”226 Speakers were aware that newspapers 
across the nation reprinted their speeches, and used these opportunities to discuss the 
victories won by Kentuckians and demonstrate that they were as patriotic as citizens in 
other parts of the nation.227 
Toasters repeatedly boasted about the importance of the Constitution and the 
freedoms it preserved for white Americans, but they remained silent about Indian 
removal. Despite contentious Congressional debates, a Supreme Court decision in favor 
of the Cherokee, and President Jackson’s refusal to accept that decision, speakers failed 
to mention removal. The speakers’ silence was telling. They celebrated the rights of 
white citizens and assumed that such rights were not meant for Native Americans.  
As Kentucky’s militia companies transitioned away from military action to 
patrolling for runaway slaves, members of the militia companies celebrated their rights as 
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free men, but worked to deny freedom to slaves. Not only did these men work to prevent 
slaves from running away, but many owned slaves themselves. The numbers of slaves per 
household increased between the Northwest Indian Wars of the 1790s and the War of 
1812. These celebrations thus reinforced Kentucky’s white hierarchy and reinforced the 
notion that white rights did not extend to the other races within the borders of the United 
States. 
 Swiss political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau once observed that community 
celebrations reminded citizens “of their forefathers’ deeds and hardships and virtues and 
triumphs, stirred their hearts, set them on fire with the spirit of emulation, and tied them 
tightly to the fatherland.”228 Public gatherings for national holidays and anniversaries 
brought Kentuckians from all social classes together to listen to speakers who honored 
heroic individuals and the nation. These community gatherings helped white citizens 
forge a common memory about the conflicts in which Kentuckians participated. Orators 
did not discuss Kentuckians who fled in battle or displayed other cowardly behavior, nor 
did they discuss the disastrous defeats of the Harmar and St. Clair campaigns or at the 
Battle of River Raisin. Instead, speakers honored the men who died in these battles for 
the sacrifice they made to Kentucky and United States. In the case of Battle of River 
Raisin, speakers nearly ignored the three hundred who died in battle and focused on the 
thirty killed the next morning by Indians allied to the British. These gatherings helped 
create a selective collective memory that extolled the exploits of the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers. Later generations learned of the militia’s accomplishments and forgot about 
their shortcomings on the battlefield. 
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 In April 1810, William Henry Harrison recalled his service as a young officer 
under Anthony Wayne. Tensions between whites and Native Americans in the Old 
Northwest were increasing because of white incursions into Indian Territory. Within a 
year, Harrison would again face warriors at the Battle of Tippecanoe. He wrote to Scott, 
now governor of Kentucky, praising Wayne: 
If General Wayne had marched his army in close columns instead of those 
long flexible files which enabled him to penetrate the woods with facility 
and to present a very long extended front to the enemy on every point of 
attack, if he had neglected to reconnoiter the country in every direction as 
he advanced to prevent an attack from the enemy before he completed his 
disposition to receive them, or if, instead of putting them up with the 
bayonet and keeping up the charge until they were entirely broken and 
dispersed, he had permitted them to exercise their skill in distant shooting 
from behind trees, – the 20th of August, 1794, would now have produced 
as melancholy recollections as the 4th of November, 1791.229 
  
Harrison’s letter reveals that he still pondered the training and tactics the army 
refined under Wayne’s leadership. Harrison retained many lessons from Wayne, but he 
differed in his greater appreciation of the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers. Harrison’s 
decision to request their participation in the invasion of Upper Canada gave the militia an 
opportunity to redeem itself after the defeat in early 1813. The successful invasion of fall 
1813 erased the humiliation Kentuckians suffered after the defeat at River Raisin, and 
Kentuckians celebrated the victory at the Battle of the Thames for decades. 
                                                 





The few victories of the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers, particularly their raids 
under Scott and Wilkinson in 1791 demonstrated that they could adopt and refine tactics 
learned from Indians. But the wins pale in comparison to the militia’s defeats and the 
number of soldiers they lost in battle. The militia’s adoption of Native tactics helped 
make them proficient in the skulking way of war and Kentuckians improved these tactics 
with the widespread use of the horse, but their record in battle reveals that Native 
Americans were better individual soldiers and succeeded in killing more Americans than 
they lost in battle. Still, their smaller population could not sustain the losses of warriors 
and important leaders. The few battles in which they lost significant leaders forced them 
to sign treaties that surrendered more land to the expanding United States. 
 In May 1816, John Quincy Adams wrote to his father, former President John 
Adams: “my countrymen . . . look too intently to their Triumphs & turn their eyes too 
lightly away from their disasters.” He believed that Americans were “rather more proud 
than they have reason [to be] of the War.”230 Adams’s statement accurately described 
Kentuckians’ collective memory of the Indian wars and the War of 1812. In the months 
after the War of 1812, Kentuckians extolled the efforts of their militia at community 
gatherings and in public writing, largely in response to Andrew Jackson’s statement that 
Kentuckians displayed cowardice at the Battle of New Orleans. They pointed to the 
successful invasion of Upper Canada and defeat of Tecumseh’s Pan-Indian 
Confederation. Ignoring their numerous defeats, they wrote a glamorous history of the 
Kentucky militia. Kentuckians built up the militia’s mythological status in the following 
decades by recalling the exploits of mounted Kentuckians at holiday and anniversary 
                                                 





celebrations. Speakers at these celebrations praised the militia’s victories and honored the 
dead of their numerous defeats. Speakers only rarely spoke of Kentuckians lost to Indian 
warriors at River Raisin, and under Harmar and St. Clair. And they never mentioned 
western citizens’ fears when these defeats left the state open to attack. Kentucky won the 
final battles in these wars and speakers focused on the militia’s successes rather than their 
defeats. 
This inaccurate narrative passed down through generations to modern historians 
such as John Grenier who argues that Kentuckians were the best and most sought after 
Indian fighters by the 1810s. But their record in battle offers little evidence to support the 
claim that they were the best troops for defeating Indians in the Trans-Appalachian West. 
Nonetheless, contemporary newspapers and speakers supported the militiamen, praising 
them when successful while offering excuses to outsiders when they suffered defeat. 
Beyond Kentucky, only Harrison sought the support of the Kentucky Mounted 
Volunteers in battle. Wayne thanked Scott for Kentuckians’ contributions to his 
campaign, but he used them as pack horses to alleviate supply shortages and to reinforce 
regular dragoons. He did not think highly of the Kentucky militia and employed them in 
ways that he thought least risky to his offensive. Despite the preponderance of evidence, 
early national Kentuckians forged a narrative that presented the state’s militia as the best 
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